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I. INTRODUCTION
As developed by the courts in the mid- to late-twentieth
century, misuse is a defense to a claim of patent or copyright
infringement that is often defined as resting upon proof that the
patent or copyright plaintiff has attempted to broaden the scope
of her intellectual property rights (IPRs) with an anticompetitive
effect.' As such, misuse shares some features with both the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Professors Herb
Hovenkamp and Mark Janis for inviting me to present this paper at their Innovation,
Business & Law Colloquium at the University of Iowa College of Law in April 2007, and
Professor Craig Joyce for inviting me to present it at the University of Houston Law
Center's Intellectual Property and Information Law Symposium in Santa Fe, New Mexico,
in June 2007; participants at these two events, for their comments and criticism; and
Sharada Devarasetty and Adina Pollan for research assistance. Any errors that remain
are mine.
1. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)); see
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venerable equitable doctrine of unclean hands and with antitrust
law. Unlike the doctrine of unclean hands, however, misuse
(according to most courts) may be asserted by a defendant who is
not himself a victim of the plaintiffs alleged misconduct. In other
words, there is no misuse "standing" requirement, as would be
necessary to assert the defense of unclean hands in a contract
action-or, for that matter, to assert a viable antitrust claim.2
This brings us to a second curious feature of the doctrine: despite
the courts' invocation of misuse as a tool for combating
anticompetitive uses of IPRs, defendants generally have a
somewhat easier time proving patent or copyright misuse than
do plaintiffs (or counterclaimants) proving antitrust violations.
Despite the misuse doctrine's purported relation to competition
policy, courts continue to state that "misuse may arise when the
conditions of antitrust violation are not met"3 (subject to a few
exceptions) without precisely delineating what those conditions
are. This departure from conventional antitrust standards for
proving competitive harm is particularly striking in some cases
involving copyright misuse; while the patent misuse doctrine in
recent years has moved toward incorporating antitrust standards
for evaluating competitive harm, it continues to diverge from
those standards in some notable respects. A third feature of
misuse, of fairly recent origin, is the application (or proposed
application) of the doctrine in cases involving arguably excessive
assertions of copyright rights that do not touch upon competition
policy as traditionally understood. Put another way, we may be
witnessing the evolution of misuse as a complement to fair use,
merger, or other copyright doctrines that balance the social costs
also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204-06 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating that "[m]isuse often exists where the patent or copyright holder has
engaged in some form of anti-competitive behavior," but also "recogniz[ing] that it might
operate beyond its traditional anti-competition context," such as when the owner
"attempt[s] to disrupt a copyright's goal to increase the store of creative expression for the
public good").
2. In the copyright context, however, a few courts recently have required some
showing of a "nexus" between the misconduct and the claim asserted against the
defendant, while others have rejected this requirement. See infra note 160 and
accompanying text.
3. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that misuse is "a broader wrong than [an] antitrust violation because of the
economic power that may be derived from the patentee's right to exclude"); see also Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) (stating that, when
there is patent misuse, "it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the
ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act"); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The concept of patent misuse arose to
restrain practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew




and benefits of copyright protection, not limited to the costs and
benefits that would be relevant in an antitrust context. A few
scholars have proposed a similar expansion of patent misuse.4 A
fourth feature that distinguishes misuse is its remedy-namely,
the unenforceability of the misused patent or copyright unless
and until the misuse has been purged, meaning that its effects
have dissipated.5 While this sanction might seem roughly
appropriate to the harm caused by the misuse in some instances,
it bears no necessary relationship to the scope of the misconduct
or the harm flowing from it. This, in turn, poses a risk that in
some cases the sanction will be grossly disproportionate to the
offense and thus may create a substantial risk of overdeterrence.
In this Article, I propose several reforms to the existing law
of misuse. First, contrary to the opinions of some skeptics, misuse
can play a useful, albeit limited, role in patent and copyright
policy. In particular, misuse can play a role in discouraging
conduct giving rise to relatively speculative threats to
competition, in cases in which there is no corresponding social
benefit; and in discouraging overly broad assertions of IPRs,
particularly copyright rights. But I stress the word "limited." In
order to avoid overdeterring socially useful conduct, assertions of
misuse should be (to borrow a phrase from another controversy)
safe, legal, and rare. Second, courts should distinguish between
transactional and litigation misuse. Only the latter should result
in unenforceability of the patent or copyright for the duration of
the misuse; the former should result only in unenforceability of
the offending contractual provision-and whatever other
sanctions, if any, are appropriate as a matter of antitrust or
other law. As a corollary, only parties who are victimized by the
misuse would have standing to raise the defense.
Part II traces the development of the misuse doctrine, with
particular emphasis on some of its more recent manifestations in
both the copyright and patent contexts. Part III presents my
arguments in support of the above claims and critiques some
applications of the existing law. Part IV concludes.
II. DOCTRINAL CONTOURS
The early cases from which the misuse doctrine evolved all
involved questions of whether patent owners could enforce their
4. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400-01 (2003) (arguing that applying antitrust rules should not
apply to patent misuse because policy goals for antitrust and patent misuse are different).
5. See id. at 402 ("The patent holder will be denied relief until the abusive practice
has been abandoned and the effects of the practice have dissipated.").
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patents against persons who lawfully purchased, through
intermediaries, products incorporating patented inventions but
who then disregarded notices affixed to these products stating
that product use was subject to patentee-imposed restrictions.6
Beginning in 1913, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a series of
patent infringement cases that both extended the first-sale or
exhaustion principle announced in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus7 to
6. To put these cases in context, in 1902, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bement
v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 92-94 (1902), that the Patent Act permitted (and the
Sherman Act did not forbid) the licensing of the right to make and sell a patented
invention, subject to an obligation on the part of the licensee/manufacturer to resell the
product at a specified price. The Court reaffirmed this rule in its 1926 decision, United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926), although it has since hinted the
rule may no longer be valid. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964)
(noting that, although "price fixing in the marketing of patent articles had been condoned"
previously, resale price fixing through a "coercive type of 'consignment' agreement is
illegal under the antitrust laws"). Nevertheless, in 1908, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908), interpreted the language of the Copyright Act as not
conferring upon copyright owners the right to prevent remote purchasers of lawfully made
copies from reselling those copies at any price the latter chose. In 1911, the Court held in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911), that the
Sherman Act rendered unenforceable a contractual obligation between the manufacturer
of a nonpatented product on the one hand, and wholesalers and retailers on the other,
requiring the latter entities to resell the product at issue at a specified price. Dr. Miles
thus established the principle, subject to the Bement/General Electric exception, that
minimum resale price maintenance was unlawful per se. (The Supreme Court overruled
Dr. Miles this past term, however. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007). Under federal antitrust law, resale price maintenance is now
subject to the rule of reason.) Just a few months after the Court's decision in Dr. Miles,
the Court held in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1912), that a person who
bought a patented mimeograph machine, conditioned upon her agreement to use only
(nonpatented) ink made by the patentee, engaged in an infringing use when she used
another company's ink instead; and the supplier of the ink, who was aware of the license
restriction, was liable for contributory infringement. The Court, in other words, approved
of a tying arrangement; but within two years Congress responded by enacting section 3 of
the Clayton Act, which specifically forbids some forms of tying. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000)
(prohibiting business transactions that restrict the purchaser's access to competing goods
or services where such a restriction substantially lessens competition or creates a
monopoly). But even before the statutory change, the tide had begun to turn, as described
in the text above.
There is also a smattering of decisions hinting at a trademark and even trade
secret misuse doctrine as well, but the case law remains sketchy. Applications of the
doctrine to trademarks in particular might harm consumers by enabling infringers to
continue using trademarks in a confusing manner. See generally 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP
ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 3.5, at 3-52 to 3-54 (2007) (suggesting trademark owners could
use "a trademark as a cover for a scheme among competitors to divide up markets"
through a franchise tying arrangement, but that dividing markets may be "a perfectly
rational solution to the problem of consumer confusion resulting from overlapping
marks"); 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 31:91, at 31-162 to 3-163 (2007) ("[An additional policy pointing toward reluctance to
uphold an antitrust misuse defense in trademark litigation is the necessity of protecting
customers from confusion."). In any event, these other forms of misuse are beyond the
scope of this Article.
7. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that
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patent disputes and provided a rationale for the subsequent
development of a separate patent misuse defense.' In Bauer &
Cie v. O'Donnell,9 for example, the Court held that a notice
affixed to a product incorporating a patented invention did not
obligate the defendant, who had purchased the product from a
wholesaler, to offer the product for resale at the price specified in
the notice.'1 Similarly, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Manufacturing Co.," the plaintiff sold film projecting
"copyright statutes... do not create the right to impose... a limitation at which the book
shall be sold at retail by future purchasers" because the right only extends to the first
production of the copyrighted work); see also supra note 6 (discussing the Bobbs-Merrill
decision).
8. A few earlier patent cases foreshadowed the above decisions to some extent. For
example, in Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873), the plaintiff licensed a firm to make
and sell coffin lids embodying his invention within a ten-mile radius centered on the city
of Boston. The firm sold some coffin lids to the defendant who then used them, without
permission from the patentee, in his undertaking business seventeen miles away. Id. at
454. The Court construed the Patent Act as permitting the defendant to use the product
without authorization, on the ground that "when the patentee.. . sells a
machine ... whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he
parts with the right to restrict that use." Id. at 456; see also Keeler v. Standard Folding
Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895) ("Where the patentee ... chooses himself to make and
vend a patented article of manufacture, ... a purchaser can use the article in any part of
the United States, and, unless restrained by contact with the patentee, can sell or dispose
of the same."); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) ("When the machine passes
to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly .... and is
no longer under the protection of the act of Congress."). A more recent case often cited as
support for the first-sale doctrine is United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252
(1942), which held "[t]he first vending of any article manufactured under a patent puts
the article beyond the reach of the monopoly which that patent confers." As Professor
Robinson points out, these earlier cases, arguably unlike Bauer and other twentieth-
century cases cited in the text above, seem to imply that use restrictions might be
enforceable if made part of an express contractual condition. Glen 0. Robinson, Personal
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1465-66 (2004). The Federal Circuit now
follows this reading of the first-sale doctrine as a default rule. See infra notes 59-66 and
accompanying text (analyzing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. and concluding the
first-sale doctrine is merely the default rule that provides no defense to unauthorized
use). Whether it is consistent with Bauer and the other cases cited is debatable. See
Robinson, supra, at 1469 (referring with approval to the Federal Circuit's reading of the
case law as a 'creative misreading' of the prior texts" (quoting HAROLD BLOOM, THE
ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY xlv (Oxford 2d ed. 1997))). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in a case that poses the question whether the Federal
Circuit has correctly interpreted patent law's first-sale doctrine as merely a default rule.
See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub
nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937, 2007 WL 2768020 (Sept. 25,
2007).
9. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
10. Id. at 16-18; see also Boston Store of Chi. v. Am. Gramophone Co., 246 U.S. 8,
25, 27 (1918) (finding that the power to fix prices "in derogation of the general law was
not within the monopoly conferred by the patent law"); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917) (finding the "real and poorly-concealed purpose" of a
license notice was to fix the resale price, making the notice valid).
11. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
906 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:4
equipment incorporating its patent, subject to a notice warning
subsequent purchasers that they were authorized to use the
equipment only on the condition that they exhibited films
controlled by the plaintiff. 2 As in Bauer, the Court held that a
defendant who had lawfully acquired the equipment from a
middleman and then ignored the notice was not liable for patent
infringement. 3 In these cases, the Court relied (as it had in
Bobbs-Merrill) upon statutory interpretation (here, a narrow
construction of the Patent Act's grant of the exclusive rights to
use and sell), 4 as well as the premise that the first sale
adequately compensates the patent owner, 5 and upon a general
distaste for restraints on alienation."6 More importantly, the
Court appeared to be swayed by the anti-price-fixing policy
articulated in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.
17
Likewise, in Motion Picture Patents Co., the Court expressed
misgivings over patentee efforts to "extend the scope of its patent
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its
operation but which are no part of the patented invention."',
12. Id. at 506.
13. Id. at 512-19 (reciting the holding in Bauer that the patent owner's "right to
vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale").
14. See Bauer, 229 U.S. at 17 (concluding that "the right to vend in the patent
statute is not distinguishable from the right of vending given in the copyright act"; in both
statutes, Congress intended to protect the right to sell, but not the right to fix prices for
resale).
15. Id. at 16.
16. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917).
17. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405 (1911)
(denying the ability of the manufacturer to fix prices of future sales absent an agreement
or statutory right to do so); see also Boston Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone, 246 U.S. 8,
21-25 (1918) (surveying case law disallowing the owner of intellectual property to set
fixed prices for future sales); Straus, 243 U.S. at 501 (rendering unenforceable a "License
Notice" which attempted to fix prices on future sales); Bauer, 229 U.S. at 11-12
(reaffirming the principle that the goal of fixing prices on future transactions is against
public policy).
18. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 516, 519 (describing the restraint at
issue as conferring "a potential power for evil over an industry which must be recognized
as an important element in the amusement life of the nation" and potentially being
"gravely injurious to that public interest, which ... is more a favorite of the law than is
the promotion of private fortunes"); see also Boston Store, 246 U.S. at 25 (holding the
price-fixing contract in question "contrary to the general law and void"); Straus, 243 U.S.
at 501 (finding the "real and poorly-concealed purpose" of the plaintiffs "License Notice"
was "to restrict the price" of the machines); Bauer, 229 U.S. at 17-18 ("[Ilt was the
intention of Congress to secure an exclusive right to sell, and there is no grant of a
privilege to keep up prices and prevent competition by notices restricting the price at
which the article may be resold."). The Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. also stated
that section 3 of the Clayton Act overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 517-18; see also Boston Store, 246 U.S. at 22
(noting that A.B. Dick, a 4-3 decision, was decided at a time when there was one vacancy
on the Court). From 1913 to 1918, each member of the A.B. Dick majority, consisting of
2007] MISUSE 907
Taken together, these cases, along with Bobbs-Merrill, not only
established the first-sale doctrine (which to this day permits the
owner of a lawfully made product incorporating a patent or
copyright to resell the product without having to obtain
permission from the patent or copyright owner), 9 but also set the
stage for the evolution of a distinct patent misuse doctrine
twenty-some years later.
The Supreme Court's 1942 decision in Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co. 20 was the first to clearly articulate the contours
of the patent misuse doctrine as it exists today. Morton Salt
owned a patent on a machine for depositing salt tablets, and it
leased machines that incorporated this invention on the condition
that the lessees (commercial canners) use the machines only in
conjunction with nonpatented salt tablets manufactured by a
Morton subsidiary.2' Morton filed a patent infringement suit
against G.S. Suppiger Co., a manufacturer and seller of allegedly
infringing machines.22 Without passing judgment on whether the
patent was valid or infringed, the district court entered judgment
for Suppiger, on the ground that the licenses restrained trade.22
The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment on the ground that
Justices Lurton, McKenna, Holmes, and Van Devanter, dissented from the holdings in
each of the new cases of which they took part in the consideration.
After a break of some thirteen years, the Court reaffirmed the holding in Motion
Picture Patents Co. in two patent infringement cases in the 1930s. See Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 31-33 (1931). By this time, the Court had also concluded that tying
arrangements involving patents could violate section 3 of the Clayton Act. See United
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 462 (1922) (finding restrictive clauses in
the leases of patented machines in violation of the Clayton Act); see also Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936) ("The Clayton Act names no exception to
its prohibition of monopolistic tying clauses."). But cf Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W.
Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179-83 (1938) (affirming a judgment of patent infringement
where the patentee had licensed the manufacture and sale of patented articles for private
use, the defendant purchased the articles from the licensee, but then the defendant used
them for a commercial purpose use other than that which the patentee had licensed).
19. The Copyright Act of 1976 codifies the first-sale doctrine as applied to
copyrighted works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)-(b); see also Quality King Distribs.,
Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1998) (considering the
applicability of the first-sale doctrine with respect to copyrighted articles made or sold
abroad). Although the first-sale doctrine remains good law in the patent context as well,
see, e.g., Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2003), it has
never been codified in the Patent Act itself.
20. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
21. Id. at 489-91.
22. Id. Suppiger also sold salt tablets, and thus would potentially be a victim of any
attempt by Morton to monopolize the salt tablet market; but as noted in the text above,
there was no proof that Morton had monopolized that market. In any event, the Court
expressly stated that "nothing turns on the fact that [Suppiger] also competes with
[Morton] in the sale of the tablets." Id. at 490-91.
23. Id. at 489-90.
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the licenses did not violate the Clayton Act because they did not
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
the market for salt tablets.24 The Supreme Court, however,
without passing judgment on the Seventh Circuit's Clayton Act
analysis, reversed, citing the unclean-hands principle that courts
"may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using
the right asserted contrary to the public interest."25 The Court
concluded that the use of a patent "to suppress competition in the
sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid
of a court of equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one
who is a competitor."6 Most importantly, the Court declined to
limit this new doctrine to cases in which the patentee's
misconduct relates to the particular act or transaction at
issue -a traditional limitation upon the application of the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands2 -- or in which the defendant
competed with the plaintiff in the market for the unpatented
product.29 Thus, "regardless of whether the particular defendant
24. Id. at 490.
25. Id. at 492.
26. Id. at 491.
27. Id. at 492-93.
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 cmt.
d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (stating that, under the doctrine of unclean hands, "a
party guilty of inequitable conduct in the underlying transaction may on that account be
denied a claim based on unjust enrichment" (emphasis added)). The doctrine of unclean
hands would retain some applicability within the realm of patent and copyright law even
if my proposed narrowing of the misuse doctrine were to be accepted. See, e.g., Saxon v.
Blarm, 968 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming a district court's judgment that the
doctrine of unclean hands prevented a copyright owner from enforcing his copyright, in a
slightly revised version of a work, against a defendant to whom he had assigned the
copyright in an earlier version of the work, where the marketing of the revised version
would undermine the economic value of that assignment). Similarly, doctrines such as
inequitable conduct and fraud of the Patent or Copyright Office would continue to prevent
the assertion of IPRs under applicable circumstances. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting a patentee may be
subject to antitrust liability for (1) asserting a patent infringement claim based upon a
patent procured by knowing and willful fraud or (2) asserting "sham" patent rights);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc) (stating the defense of inequitable conduct, which can result in
unenforceability of the patent in its entirety, resides in the patentee's "failure to disclose
material information, or submission of false information, with an intent to deceive" and
that both "materiality and intent must be proven by clear and convincing evidence");
Lennon v. Seaman, 84 F. Supp. 2d 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating a party seeking to
establish fraud on the Copyright Office, and hence copyright invalidity, "must establish
that the application for copyright registration is factually inaccurate, that the
inaccuracies were willful or deliberate. . . , and that the Copyright Office relied on those
misrepresentations" (citations omitted)).
29. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493-94 (noting the doctrine applies equally to suits
against competitors and noncompetitors). This was, as noted above, despite the fact that
Suppiger did compete with Morton's subsidiary in the manufacture of salt tablets. Id. at
491. Similarly irrelevant was the fact that Suppiger was neither an unwilling party to the
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has suffered from the misuse of the patent,"" the patentee is
foreclosed from obtaining relief, "at least until it is made to
appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and that
the consequences of the misuse ... have been dissipated."3'
The Supreme Court extended the holding of Morton Salt in
subsequent cases. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., for example, the Court held that misuse could consist of
setting royalty rates on the basis of the licensee's sale of
unpatented products,32 while in Brulotte v. Thys, it disapproved of
the licensing of a patent on the condition that the licensee
continue paying royalties after the expiration of the patent.33
restrictive licenses nor (like the defendant in Motion Picture Patents Co.) charged with
inducing others to breach the restrictive licenses.
30. Id. at 494.
31. Id. at 493. For similar cases decided at or near the time of Morton Salt, see
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 393 (1947) (analyzing the
Government's suit to enjoin the International Salt Company "from carrying out provisions
of the leases of its patented machines to the effect that lessees would use therein only
International's salt products"), and B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 495-96
(1942) (addressing "the question whether the owner of a method patent who authorizes
manufacturers to use it only with materials furnished by him may enjoin infringement by
one who supplies the manufacturer with materials for use by the patented method and
aids in such use").
32. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969)
("There is nothing in the right granted the patentee... which empowers him to insist on
payment not only for use but also for producing products which do not employ his
discoveries at all."). But see Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408-09
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that "voluntary" package licensing does not constitute misuse,
and distinguishing Zenith on the ground that the licensing arrangement there was
coerced).
33. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30-34 (1964) ("[A] patentee's use of a
royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per
se."); see also Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017-21 (7th Cir. 2002)
(following Brulotte on stare decisis grounds despite questioning the Court's reasoning).
But cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261-64 (1979) (holding federal
patent law did not preempt a contract to pay a 5% royalty if a patent issued on the
inventor's invention or a lower royalty indefinitely if a patent did not issue). Technically,
Brulotte was not a misuse case; the Court did not hold the patent at issue to be
unenforceable for the very good reason that it had already expired. See Brulotte, 379 U.S.
at 32-34 (discussing the ramifications of the "post-expiration" period). The plaintiff was
instead suing for breach of the agreement to pay post-patent termination royalties, and it
was this agreement that the Court held to be unenforceable on the ground that it violated
federal patent policy. See id. at 33-34 ("[A]fter expiration of the last of the patents ... , an
attempt to project it into another term by continuation of the licensing agreement is
unenforceable."). Subsequent courts, however, have interpreted Brulotte as standing for
the principle that conditioning a patent license on the agreement to pay post-termination
royalties does constitute patent misuse. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997); County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 937,
948 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Engineered Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 951, 995
(N.D. Iowa 2004); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d
1002, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2003). But see Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, _ F.3d -, -, 2007 WL 2482099,
at *6-*7 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007) (questioning the conventional reading of Brulotte, but
holding that even under that reading Brulotte does not vitiate the entire contract but
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Lower courts found other practices, such as "tie-outs"-licensing
a patent only on the condition that the licensee not use a
competitor's product-to constitute misuse. 4 The Supreme Court
also held in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.
(Mercoid I)35 that patent misuse could arise from tying a patent
license to the sale of a product (unlike, say, salt tablets) that has
no substantial use other than in connection with the patented
invention (a so-called nonstaple product)." This holding tended to
reduce the doctrine of contributory infringement to a virtual
nullity.37 In 1980, however, in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
rather only renders the offending contractual provisions unenforceable). This in turn has
given rise to a cottage industry devoted to crafting agreements in such a way that the
post-termination royalties can plausibly be attributed to something other than the
patented invention-e.g., the use of related trade secrets. See, e.g., Bogglid v. Kenner
Prods., Div. of CPG Prods. Corp., 776 F.2d 1315, 1318 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to find a
"hybrid" agreement even though the agreement was entered into before the patent issued
because the agreement required royalty payments based on patent rights beyond the term
of the patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
misuse despite arguments that the agreement contained trade secret royalty payments
where there was no line drawn between the patent and post-expiration term with respect
to the royalties applicable to each); Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 760
n.5 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the characterization of a license as a "trade secret license
agreement" when the consideration was paid for use of the device instead of disclosure
and there was a mutual understanding that a patent application would be filed), rev'd on
other grounds, 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
34. See Nat'l Lockwasher Co. v. George K Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir.
1943) (finding the patentee extended the bounds of the patent monopoly by using the
patent to "suppress the manufacture of possible competing goods not covered by its
patent"); see also Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9th
Cir. 1964) (citing the Lockwasher holding for the proposition "that a clause prohibiting a
licensee from selling articles in competition with the patented articles likewise constitutes
patent misuse").
35. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid 1), 320 U.S. 661 (1944). The
Supreme Court also issued an opinion on the companion case to Mercoid I. See Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
36. Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 665-67. The salt tablets at issue in Morton Salt, by
contrast, are usually understood to have been staple products, having substantial uses
other than in connection with Morton's patented machine. See Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 192-93 (1980); NL Chems., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc.,
No. 87-0150-L(B), 1989 WL 108508, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 1989). But cf. Morton Salt,
314 U.S. at 490 (stating that the tablets had "a particular configuration rendering them
capable of convenient use in respondent's patented machines").
37. To illustrate, consider a patented machine comprising three elements: A, B, and
C. A person who combines the three elements without authorization of the patentee has
engaged in the unlawful manufacture of the patented invention and is liable as a direct
infringer. Now suppose that another entity supplies the direct infringer with element B,
that element B has no substantial uses other than in combination with elements A and C,
and that the supplier knows the purchaser will be using element B to infringe. If the
direct infringer cannot be found or is judgment-proof, the patentee might prefer to sue the
supplier as an indirect infringer, on the theory that the supplier knowingly aided and
abetted the other in committing direct infringement. Under Mercoid I, however, merely
filing suit against the supplier put the patentee at risk of engaging in misuse, on the
ground that the patentee was using the patent to suppress competition in the market for
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Haas Co., the Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the post-
Mercoid 1952 Patent Act" as having overruled Mercoid I." As the
law now stands, patent owners can assert claims for indirect
infringement against persons who knowingly supply nonstaple
articles for others to use for the purpose of patent infringement."
More recently, Congress enacted the Patent Misuse Reform
Act of 1988"' to further limit the application of the misuse
doctrine as applied to tying arrangements. The act added two
new subparts to section 271(d) of the Patent Act, which together
with the introductory language read as follows:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall
be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
one or more of the following ... (4) refused to license or use
any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of
any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product
on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
the nonstaple good-although this result was not inevitable. One could certainly argue
that, even under Mercoid I, merely filing suit shouldn't give rise to a finding of misuse
unless the patentee has specifically conditioned the right to use the patent on the user's
agreement to buy element B from the patentee. On this theory, the patentee in the
example above could still file suit for contributory infringement against a supplier who
knowingly sold element B to a person who had no license to make and use the patented
invention. But some courts interpreted Mercoid I more broadly. See Dawson Chem. Co.,
448 U.S. at 199-200 & n.16 (discussing expansive interpretations of Mercoid 1).
38. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 271(d), 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000)). This provision reads:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of
the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement....
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)-(3) (2000).
In addition, section 271(b) of the Patent Act states that it is unlawful to "actively induce[ ]
infringement of a patent." Sections 271(b) and (c) state that one may be liable for
contributory infringement for, inter alia, selling a component of a patented machine,
"knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C § 271(b)-(c) (2000).
39. Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 214 (interpreting 35 U.S.C § 271(d) (2000)).
40. See id. at 200-02 (finding section 271(d) of the Patent Act allows a limited
power to exclude others from competing in the market for nonstaple goods in conjunction
with the patented invention).
41. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2000)).
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circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on
which the license or sale is conditioned.42
The effect of Section 271(d)(5) is to require a defendant
asserting misuse by tying prove that the patentee has market
power rather than rely upon a presumption that the patent
confers such power.43 By contrast, until recently plaintiffs
asserting antitrust tying claims were entitled to rely upon a
presumption that patents do confer market power-thus
providing a rare instance in which patent misuse doctrine made
it more difficult to prove anticompetitive conduct than did the
counterpart antitrust doctrine. 4 In 2006, however, the Supreme
Court, in accordance with the views expressed by many
contemporary economists that most patents do not confer market
power in any meaningful sense, overruled some of its own case
law and held that plaintiffs asserting claims against defendants
for allegedly tying the sale or license of patented articles must
41prove that the patent at issue conferred market power.
In 1982, Congress established the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and charged that court with, among
other things, hearing all appeals from federal district court
judgments involving claims for patent infringement. 4' The
Federal Circuit therefore has taken the leading role in recent
years in refining the contours of the patent misuse doctrine. As
the Federal Circuit has noted, Patent Act section 271(d)
establishes only safe harbors-that is, it defines what patent
42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2000).
43. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1349 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
44. See id. at 1347-49.
45. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006). Note,
however, that some economists advocated retention of the market power presumption on
the ground, inter alia, that litigated patents, as opposed to patents generally, are likely to
confer market power. See Brief of Scherer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-
10, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329) (urging that
"[blecause of the likelihood that a patent involved in litigation has substantial value and
market power, this court should maintain a rebuttable presumption of market power in
patent tying cases"). But cf. Brief of Nalebuff, Ayres, & Sullivan as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 3-4, 111. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
(No. 04-1329) (arguing that tying products necessary to the use of the patented process
should trigger a presumption of market power).
46. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37-39
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (holding that federal jurisdiction is
lacking when the patent claim does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint,
but rather is asserted instead as a counterclaim).
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misuse is not, without affirmatively stating what it is. 47 The
Federal Circuit itself has come to define patent misuse as
"impermissibly broaden[ing] the 'physical or temporal scope' of
the patent grant with anticompetitive effect,"48 and it has
developed a three-step framework for evaluating assertions of
misuse. The first step involves determining whether the
challenged conduct is either per se misuse or per se lawful.49
Per se misuse includes, among other things, conditioning the
use of the patent upon the defendant's agreement to pay post-
termination royalties (as per Brulotte v. Thys), as well as
tying.5" Per se lawful practices include everything listed in
Patent Act section 271(d)(1)-(4), e.g., asserting a claim for
contributory infringement based upon the defendant's sale of a
nonstaple item, or merely refusing to license the patent to the
defendant.5' Second, if the challenged conduct is neither per se
misuse nor per se lawful, then
47. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 173 Fed. Appx. 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(reaffirming Congress's intent that Section 271(d) serve only to specify certain actions
that do not qualify as patent misuse). The court has also made clear that patent misuse
remains a defense, not an affirmative claim (or counterclaim) for relief. See B. Braun
Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he defense of patent
misuse may not be converted to an affirmative claim for damages simply by restyling it as
a declaratory judgment counterclaim."). The same rule applies with respect to copyright
misuse. See DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("Copyright misuse is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.").
48. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
49. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(determining patent misuse by first listing instances of per se misuse found in previous
court holdings).
50. Id.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)-(4) (2000); see also Va. Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 869
(describing Section 271 as exclusions from patent misuse). The Federal Circuit also takes
the position that a unilateral refusal to license a patent can never constitute a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322,
1325-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding a unilateral refusal to license a patent does not violate
Section 2, absent proof that the antitrust defendant committed fraud in the procurement,
engaged in sham petitioning, or otherwise attempted to extend its patent beyond the
scope of the grant); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-62 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that Intel's refusal to share proprietary information with Intergraph did
not violate the essential facilities doctrine, constitute an unlawful refusal to deal, or
otherwise violate Section 2); see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1010-15
(D. Conn. 1978) (refusing to impose damages liability upon Xerox for the profits SCM lost
because of Xerox's refusal to license), affd, 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981). Some other
courts have held a refusal to license IP presumptively valid, but the antitrust plaintiff can
rebut the presumption by showing that the refusal was a pretext. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting Microsoft's argument that
its ownership of valid copyrights in its software constituted a legitimate business
justification for its licensing restrictions, given the lack of evidence that all but one of the
restrictions were directed at acts that would constitute infringement of those copyrights);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 & n.64 (1st Cir.
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a court must determine if that practice is "reasonably
within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims." If so, the
practice does not have the effect of broadening the scope
of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent
misuse. If, on the other hand, the practice has the effect
of extending the patentee's statutory rights and does so
with an anti-competitive effect, that practice must then
be analyzed in accordance with the "rule of reason."
Under the rule of reason, "the finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into
account a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
restraint's history, nature, and effect."
5 2
Using this approach, the Federal Circuit has held that
practices such as threatening to void or limit warranties if
third parties did not agree to purchase certain unpatented
products from the patent owner, or requiring the licensee to
acknowledge the validity of and avoid using the patentee's
trademarks, did not constitute misuse because they did not
broaden the scope of the patent claims. 3 Other practices, such
1994) (holding that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright does not violate Section 2,
except possibly in "rare cases" in which the antitrust plaintiff can rebut a presumption
that the defendant was motivated by a valid business justification); see also Image
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (adapting
the First Circuit's holding in Data General and affirming a jury verdict that defendant
had lacked a legitimate business justification for its refusal, and therefore was liable
under Section 2).
52. Va. Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 869 (citations omitted).
53. See id. at 868-71 (arguing that threats to void or limit warranties were, in fact,
not misuse of the patent, but rather a contractual matter between the buyer and seller
having no patent implications); Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001-02 (finding that a license
provision requiring acknowledgement of a trademark and avoidance of its use could not,
except under rare circumstances, unlawfully restrain competition in a relevant patent
market); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding licensing agreements forbidding farmers from saving any seed, covered by a
patent on genetically modified seeds, for replanting did not constitute misuse on the
ground that second-generation seeds themselves would be covered by the patent and
therefore could not be used without authorization). For a recent non-Federal Circuit case
citing the Federal Circuit's framework with approval, see County Materials Corp. v. Allan
Block Corp., No. 06-2857, 2007 WL 2701979, at *1-2 (7th Cir. Sept. 18, 2007). In County
Materials, a patent licensee filed suit for a declaratory judgment that a license provision
restricting competition against the licensor for eighteen months following termination of
the license constituted patent misuse. Given the procedural posture of the case, the
regional circuit court of appeals, rather than the Federal Circuit, had appellate
jurisdiction. The court affirmed a judgment for the licensor on the ground that the
licensee had not demonstrated anticompetitive effect. See id. at *5. In the course of so
holding, the court called into question the continuing vitality of cases such as National
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as grantbacks and field-of-use restrictions, are evaluated, if at
all, under the rule of reason."
Among the Federal Circuit's more prominent recent
decisions on misuse are Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,56 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,7 and U.S.
Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission."5 Mallinckrodt
involved patented medical devices which the patent owner
(Mallinckrodt) sold to hospitals on the condition that the
hospitals dispose of them after a single use.59 Ignoring this
restriction, several hospitals sent their used devices to Medipart
for reconditioning and then used the devices again.6"
Mallinckrodt filed suit against Medipart both for direct
infringement and for inducing the hospitals to infringe through
reuse.6' The district court concluded, on the authority of Bauer,
Motion Picture Patents, and the like, that patentees may not
impose a single-use restrictions on purchasers.62 The Federal
Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for the district court to
determine (1) whether the challenged restraint on use was
"reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims," and (2) if so,
whether the anticompetitive effects of the restraint violated the
rule of reason.63 Assuming the restraint passed muster under
these standards, the court pointedly concluded the first-sale
doctrine also would provide no defense to the claim of
unauthorized use.6" The court's reasoning therefore appears to
Lockwasher, discussed supra at note 34. See id. at *4.
54. See, e.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (remanding for determination of whether field-of-use restrictions broadened the
scope of the patent, and if so, whether they did so within the bounds of the rule of reason).
55. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
57. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2062 (2007).
58. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2899 (2006). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that, after
the initial draft of this Article had been posted on ssrn.com, I was retained by
counterclaim defendants Gigastorage Corporation and Gigastorage USA as a proposed
expert witness, in a parallel district court action involving the same patents that were at
issue in the 2005 Philips decision, on the issue of whether it was objectively reasonable to
believe, prior to the Federal Circuit's 2005 decision, that those patents were
unenforceable on the ground of patent misuse.
59. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701-02.
60. Id. at 702.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 703.
63. Id. at 708-09 (finding the facts of the case did not represent a per se antitrust or
misuse violation under Bauer or Motion Picture Patents).
64. See id. at 709 (finding the district court holding of permissible repair of the
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
indicate that the Federal Circuit views the first-sale doctrine as
merely a default rule65-that is, it applies only when the patentee
has made an unrestricted sale of an article incorporating the
patented invention.66
The two Monsanto cases both involved patents that claim,
among other things, the insertion of genetically modified enzymes
into seeds." A farmer who plants the modified seed can then spray
her crops with specified insecticides or herbicides; the insecticide
or herbicide will kill pests or other plants (such as weeds),
respectively, but it does not affect the genetically modified
organism grown from the seed.68  Monsanto licenses seed
companies to incorporate its technology into their seed, but only on
condition that the seed companies in turn license farmers to use
the seed subject to certain restraints. In particular, Monsanto
requires the seed companies to distribute seed to farmers only on
condition that the farmers use the seed for only one growing
season and not to save any seed or crop for replanting.69 In both
cases, Monsanto filed suit against a farmer who ignored these
restrictions, alleging patent infringement and (in McFarling)
breach of contract." In McFarling, the farmer argued Monsanto's
refusal to permit seed saving in effect tied the license of the
patented technology to an unpatented product, naturally-occurring
soybean seed.7' Both the lower court and the Federal Circuit
rejected this characterization, however, as well as Monsanto's
alternative characterization of the arrangement as a field-of-use
restriction, on the ground that the license did nothing more than
forbid the unauthorized manufacture of the patented invention. 2
patented product moot and vacated). But cf Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc.,
85 F.3d 1570, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing from Mallinckrodt, the court held
that, absent any contractual obligation requiring the purchasers to buy replacement parts
from the patentee, the defendant's sale of replacement parts to the patented product
purchasers did not constitute contributory infringement when the patentee instructed
purchasers to replace a component of its patented device after each use).
65. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (2001) (criticizing this result in the software
context because most software is licensed rather than sold).
66. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the
patentee, 'exhausts' the patentee's right to control further sale and use of that article by
enforcing the patent under which it was first sold.").
67. Monsanto v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto v.
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
68. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1338.
69. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339.
70. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340.
71. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1342.
72. Id. at 1342-43.
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Because second-generation seed is identical to first-generation
seed, the planting of second-generation seed necessarily results in
a "making" of the patented enzyme.73 Assuming that Monsanto's
patent validly reads on first-generation seed, it necessarily reads
on second-generation seed as well; the restriction therefore fell
squarely within the scope of Monsanto's patent rights.74 The court
rejected a similar misuse argument in Scruggs, as well as other
arguments directed towards other aspects of Monsanto's licensing
system.75 Among these arguments was a requirement, imposed
from 1996 to 1998, that seed growers who wanted to use
glyphosate herbicide in connection with Monsanto "Roundup
Ready" seed use Monsanto's own "Roundup" glyphosate
herbicide. 76 According to the majority, the fact that Roundup was
the only EPA-approved glyphosate herbicide on the market during
the period in question was dispositive-the condition threatened
no "actual adverse effect on competition."
7
73. See id. at 1343 (observing that use of the patented first-generation seed
produces nearly identical second-generation seed).
74. Id.
75. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1339, 1342 (finding no merit in Scruggs's allegations of
antitrust violations and patent misuse or his attacks on Monsanto's partner licensing
agreements, grower licensing agreements, and grower incentive programs).
76. Id. at 1339. Specifically, the court concluded, first, any challenge to Monsanto's
no-replant policy was precluded by its decision in McFarling. Id. at 1339. This no-replant
provision, as well as a related provision "requiring growers to use only seed containing
Monsanto's biotechnology for planting a single crop ('exclusivity provision')" fell within the
scope of Monsanto's patent rights. Id. at 1333, 1340. Second, it rejected a challenge to
Monsanto's imposition of a technology fee, which the court concluded was
indistinguishable from a royalty, and therefore within the scope of the patent grant. Id. at
1340. Third, the court rejected a challenge to Monsanto's requirement that seed growers
not use the seed for purposes of research or experimentation, characterizing this restraint
as "a field of use restriction .. within the protection of the patent laws." Id. Fourth, and
relatedly, the court affirmed the district court's characterization of Monsanto's prohibition
of the "stacking" of "the Roundup Ready trait with transgenic traits developed by
competitors" as a lawful field of use restriction. Id. at 1339, 1342. Fifth, the court rejected
a challenge to Monsanto's "grower incentive" program, which gave "participating seed
growers additional voluntary benefits if they choose to use Roundup herbicide exclusively
on crops containing Monsanto's Roundup technology," on the ground that the program
"was optional, not coerced." Id. at 1339-40. Note, however, that the court made no
mention of section 3 of the Clayton Act, which forbids, inter alia, a seller from discounting
or rebating a portion of the purchase price of goods on condition that the buyer agree not
to use the goods of a competitor, where the effect is substantially to lessen competition or
tends to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000). Sixth, the court rejected a challenge to
"seed partner agreements" which required "seed growers who choose to use a glyphosate
herbicide to use Roundup," on the ground that the "seed partners were not forced to buy
Roundup under the seed partner agreements." Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1339-40. Seventh,
the court rejected a challenge based on Monsanto's "alleged refusal to sell Roundup Ready
cotton seeds without the Bollgard trait," on the ground that Monsanto in fact "sells cotton
without the Bollgard trait and there is no evidence that Monsanto engineered a shortage
of Roundup Ready cotton." Id. at 1339-41.
77. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1341. In his dissent, Judge Dyk cited Federal Trade
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:4
More recently, in Philips, the court concluded that a package
licensing arrangement did not constitute patent misuse.78 Philips
owned a portfolio of patents on compact disc related technology,
some of which Philips designated as essential, and some
nonessential, for producing CDs that would comply with
applicable technical standards.79 Philips offered licenses to the
essential and nonessential patents as a package in exchange for
royalties based on the number of CDs the licensee produced,
rather than on the basis of the number of patents used.0 Philips
declined to license the patents on an individual basis.8 ' Philips
thereafter filed suit against three of its licensees, who had
stopped paying their fees, for unlawful importation into the
United States of CDs that infringed Philips's patents.82 In their
defense, the licensees asserted the package licensing system
constituted patent misuse, insofar as Philips had conditioned the
license of the essential patents on the licensees' agreement to
license the nonessential patents as well." The administrative law
Commission v. Independent Federation of Dentists for the proposition "'[that a particular
practice may be unlawful is not, in itself, a sufficient justification for collusion among
competitors to prevent it.'" Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1343 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
465 (1986)); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695-96
(1978) (holding that purported concerns over public safety do not justify collusion among
competitors). The principle that the promotion of safety or compliance with other laws is
not a cognizable procompetitive justification for otherwise anticompetitive restraints,
however, while unassailable, is also irrelevant to the vertical restraint at issue in
Scruggs. As the majority points out, because Roundup was the only approved glyphosate
herbicide during the period in which Monsanto imposed the condition, there was no
foreclosure in the market for the tied product; consumers who demanded glyphosate
herbicide would have had no choice but to purchase the tied product from Monsanto. See
Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1341 (majority opinion) (noting that Monsanto's glyphosate herbicide
was the only one approved by the EPA). Judge Dyk may have been on more sound footing
in noting that the effect of the restraint potentially was to discourage competitors "from
seeking regulatory approval or attempting to have the regulation modified or eliminated,"
and that a license merely requiring "the use of a government-approved herbicide," as
opposed to Monsanto's Roundup-branded herbicide, would have been less objectionable.
Id. at 1343-44 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, neither the
majority nor the dissent pointed to any evidence of competitors who were actually
discouraged from seeking regulatory approval for their herbicides as a result of the
restraint. Arguably there was no "forcing" either, insofar as consumers who preferred not
to use glyphosate herbicide at all were under no obligation to buy any. See id. at 1340
(majority opinion) (observing that consumers were not coerced into buying the Roundup
herbicide).
78. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1198-99 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
79. Id. at 1182.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1184.
82. Id. at 1182-83.
83. Id. at 1183.
judge and the International Trade Commission (ITC) ruled in
favor of the defendants; the Federal Circuit reversed. s4 The court
concluded, first, that the licensing arrangement did not
constitute per se misuse, despite the fact that Philips possessed
market power in the relevant market"0 and despite two earlier
Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc. 6 and United States v. Loew's, Inc.,87 that had condemned
block booking of motion pictures as a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. The court distinguished Paramount on the ground
that, in that case, licensees were required not only to license but
also to exhibit the tied films (and, as a practical matter, not to
exhibit other films in their stead); it distinguished Loew's on the
similar ground that licensees were required to pay for exhibition
rights to the tied films "at a price that was greater than the price
attributable to the desired films.""8 By contrast, Philips did not
require licensees to use the tied (nonessential) patents at all,
and, importantly, no portion of the royalty charged for the
package could be attributed to the nonessential patents alone. s9
The court noted repeatedly that Philips charged licensees based
on the number of CDs they manufactured, not the number of
patents used, and it reasoned that Philips should be no worse off
for having included the nonessential licenses in the package than
it would be if, for example, it dedicated those latter patents to the
public domain.9°  The court also cited several potential
procompetitive benefits from the package licensing arrangement,
including a reduction in transaction costs, analogous to the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) licensing system, as a
further reason to resist the per se characterization.91 In the
alternative, the court concluded another element necessary for
per se tying-an anticompetitive foreclosure of commerce in the
market for the tied patents-was lacking, citing what it saw as a
lack of evidence that the so-called nonessential patents really
were nonessential, in the sense of having viable competitive
84. Id. at 1183, 1198-99.
85. See id. at 1186 (commenting that the existence of market power does not require
a finding of patent misuse).
86. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-59 (1948) (holding
the refusal to license one copyright unless another copyright is licensed to be illegal).
87. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1962) (invalidating tying and
block-booking arrangements of motion picture films for television).
88. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1188-89.
89. Id. at 1190-91.
90. Id. at 1191.
91. Id. at 1192-93.
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alternatives.92 This latter holding, as well as the perceived
procompetitive benefits of the arrangement, also may have
doomed any assertion that the package arrangement constituted
misuse under the rule of reason, although the court remanded for
further consideration. 3
Philips is an interesting case in that the court (if anything)
construed the misuse doctrine as being even more difficult to
sustain than would be the analogous antitrust claim.94 To see
why, consider the following hypothetical based upon a slightly
different hypothetical posed by a student commentator.95 Suppose
that P owns patents on two inventions, X and Y. Because there
are no good substitutes for patent X, patent X confers market
power. Potential licensees of patent X, however, need to use the
patent in combination with a complementary patent. P's patent Y
is one such complementary patent, as are patents A, B, C, D, and
E, all of which are owned by other persons. The market for these
complementary patents is competitive, meaning that firms
within this market earn no more than the normal rate of return
on capital, and the market price for a standard license is $5.96
Finally, suppose that P can maximize her profit in the market for
patent X by selling 100 licenses each for a monopoly price of $50.
P can either bundle patents X and Y together or she can leave
her licensees free to choose whichever complementary patent
they want. Licensees who are free to choose whichever
complementary patent they want pay $55 for the package: $50
for patent X, and $5 for the complementary patent (payable to
whoever owns that patent). If instead P bundles X and Y
together, she still has no incentive to charge more than $55 for
the package. Prior to bundling, licensees knew that the implicit
price of a bundle was $55, and P maximized her profit by selling
100 licenses to patent X; thus if she raises the price of the
bundle, her profits go down.
This is the standard analysis that leads Chicago School
observers to doubt that tying typically enables the monopolist to
92. Id. at 1193-95.
93. See id. at 1198-99 (remanding in light of the Commission's failure to address all
findings under per se and rule of reason analyses). On remand, the Commission entered
judgment for Philips. See Certain Recordable Compact Discs and Rewritable Compact
Discs, Inv. No. 337-TA-474, Commission Op. (Int'l Trade Comm'n, Feb. 5, 2007).
94. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1185-86 (noting some activities that would require scrutiny
under antitrust laws may not qualify as patent misuse).
95. See Daniel P. Homiller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National
Harrow to "The Nine No-Nos" to Not Likely, 2006 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 007, i91 35-38
(2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr0007.html.
96. The competitive price actually may be near zero if the marginal cost of
producing each license is very low.
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derive a second monopoly profit in the market for the tied good.97
The bundling strategy nevertheless may be vulnerable to an
antitrust claim, even if P extracts the same profit under either
strategy. According to most courts, tying is per se unlawful when
the defendant has market power in the market for the tying
product, there are separate demands for the tying and tied
products, and the defendant coerces buyers to buy the tied
product from the defendant instead of other sellers.98 All of these
elements arguably are satisfied in the hypothetical; sellers of the
competing complementary patents are indeed foreclosed from the
tied product market. On the other hand, some courts require, as
an additional element in a tying case, proof of anticompetitive
harm in the market for the tied product. If anticompetitive
harm is defined to mean harm to consumer or social welfare, as
opposed to harm to competitors, this element is not satisfied in
the hypothetical.' 0 Yet while this may be the better result, as a
matter of rational antitrust policy it is not clear that the
Supreme Court is quite ready to interpret tying law in this
fashion.'0 ' Similarly, the Federal Circuit's effort to distinguish
97. The classic analysis is found in Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 35 (1957) (concluding that existence of separate charges for
the tying product and the tied product does not necessarily create a second monopoly).
98. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (listing
elements plaintiff must show to prove a tying arrangement), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2062.
In addition, the tie must affect a substantial volume of commerce in the market for the
tied product. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
99. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1341 (declaring that under the rule of reason a defense
of patent misuse requires a showing of stifled competition).
100. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)
(focusing the ultimate inquiry on potential harm to consumers); United Farmers Agent
Ass'n, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d 233, 235 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (defining harm as
the actual effect of a tying arrangement on the market's competition); see also Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which
the [Sherman] Act protects."). But cf In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., No.
96-CV-5238, 2003 WL 1712568, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (holding that a showing of
anticompetitive harm of a tying arrangement is optional).
101. If licensees are indifferent among alternatives Y, A, B, C, D, and E in the
hypothetical above, then arguably there is no valid tying claim. See Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28 (1984) (stating that when consumers are
indifferent among alternatives in the tied product market, tying "cannot be said to have
foreclosed a choice that would have otherwise been made 'on the merits'"); Christopher R.
Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying
Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 813 (2004) (citing Jefferson Parish for the proposition
that a tying arrangement does not stifle competition where consumers are indifferent to
choices among the tied product). If some licensees would prefer one of the other
alternatives to Y, however, it remains to be seen whether the Court would view the
foreclosure of these alternatives from the market for the tied product as competitive harm
even though (as in the hypothetical above) the monopolist derives only one monopoly
profit. But cf Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 46 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating that, in an exclusive dealing case, the approach-"which
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Paramount and Loew's may make economic sense,112 but it is not
easy to reconcile with the actual decisions. The Paramount
Court, for example, defined block-booking as "the practice of
licensing, or offering for license, one feature or group of features
depends on 'foreclosure' of sales to competitors without proof of injury to consumers-
reflects a bygone day in antitrust analysis," though not all cases relying upon that
approach have been overruled).
It is also conceivable that the Federal Circuit underestimated the potential
anticompetitive nature of the package licensing at issue in Philips. When a monopolist
bundles two products together, a potential competitor in either the tying or tied product
market may have to enter both markets simultaneously in order to compete. The cost of
doing so may constitute a barrier to entry, in which case bundling can be anticompetitive
in the sense that it enables the monopolist to preserve her monopoly in the tying product
market for longer than would otherwise be the case. See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling 1-2
(Yale Int'l Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 14, 1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=185193 (positing that tying gains from entry-deterrent effect are
significant when compared to nominal gains from price discrimination). But cf. Bruce H.
Kobayahsi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling
by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature 33-34 (Geo. Mason Law & Econs. Research
Paper No. 35, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abnstractid=836724 (arguing that,
while bundling can be anticompetitive, the literature thus far provides insufficient
guidance for evaluating the pro- and anticompetitive benefits of bundling in the real
world). More generally, economists have identified several possible situations in which it
might be plausible to leverage a monopoly in one product market into a monopoly in a
second market. See Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 196-97
(2002) (presenting two models that suggest tying enables a monopolist to realize a second
monopoly in an emerging market); Eric B. Rasmussen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 1137, 1143-44 (1991) (concluding that certain exclusionary agreements do
allow monopolists to exclude competitors and potential competitors); see also Michael D.
Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837-40 (1990)
(addressing criticisms of the leverage theory); Jay Pil Choi, Antitrust Analysis of Tying
Arrangements 5-11 (Center for Econ. Studies and Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 1336, 2004), available at http://ssrn.conabstract=629001 (discussing academic
treatment of the leverage theory). Absent the specific conditions identified in works such
as these, however, the common view among economists today is that leveraging is not a
likely result of tying. See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY &
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 281-83 (2003) (surveying specific situations and academic
assumptions which tend to support the leverage theory).
102. It is hardly obvious to me, however, that anything hangs on the court's
distinction between a tying arrangement in which the tied product is a product or service,
on the one hand, as opposed to intellectual property, on the other. See U.S. Philips Corp.
v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1188-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (differentiating Philips's
patent-to-patent arrangement from the tying arrangements in Paramount and Loew's). In
any event, the Philips court did not attempt to distinguish Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), a case that did involve patent-to-patent
tying. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3bl, at 3-24.1 (noting the Philips court's
failure to distinguish Zenith). In Zenith, the Supreme Court held that the patent owner
may have engaged in misuse by conditioning the grant of its package license upon the
licensee's agreement to pay royalties based on total sales of radios and television sets,
regardless of whether the patents at issue were used in those products. See Zenith, 395
U.S. at 134-38; see also Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("'If convenience of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total-sales
royalty provision, there are no misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached
to the license'" (quoting Zenith, 395 U.S. at 138)).
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on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or
group of features.' °3 It did not, as the court in Philips asserted,
refer to the practice of requiring the exhibition of the tied film,'
4
any more than the Philips package required the use of the tied
patents. Although the Supreme Court may well choose to reverse
the Federal Circuit someday, as it continues its move away from
the Warren Court and earlier antitrust precedent in favor of a
more Chicago-friendly approach, the Court has repeatedly stated
that it is not for the lower courts to anticipate such moves."'
And yet at the same time it is clear that patent misuse
remains, at least in a few discrete respects, easier to prove than
would be the counterpart antitrust violations. An agreement to
continue collecting royalties after the patent term, for example,
as in Brulotte, would not constitute an antitrust violation absent
much clearer proof of anticompetitive effect.0 6  Similarly,
although Patent Act section 271(d)(5) moves the law of tying
misuse closer to its antitrust counterpart, the overlap is not
complete; it may be that assertions of tying misuse can be
sustained on a lesser showing of anticompetitive harm than
103. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 157 (stating that the district court "enjoined defendants from performing or
entering into any license in which the right to exhibit one feature is conditioned upon the
licensee's taking one or more other features" (emphasis added)).
104. See Philips, 424 F.3d at 1187-88 (asserting that the block-booking arrangement
in Paramount forced purchasers of packaged licenses to exhibit unwanted films in order
to exhibit the desired films).
105. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (reinforcing the
Supreme Court's principle that lower courts should not treat a decision as overruled until
the Supreme Court has expressly overruled that decision), rev'd on other grounds, 522
U.S. 3 (1997). The court is probably correct, however, in suggesting that, all other things
being equal, block-booking is more problematic than package licensing, insofar as the
former, but not the latter, requires the use of the tied product. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 22.4, at 22-28.3 (arguing that block-booking may be more harmful than
package licensing because competitor foreclosure is more of a concern in a block-booking
arrangement). Note also that the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission
guidelines state the agencies' view that, notwithstanding Paramount, package licensing
should be treated no differently from any other alleged tying arrangement. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5, at 26 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (advising that package licensing found to be a tying
arrangement will be evaluated the same as any other tying arrangement).
106. See Zenith, 395 U.S. at 140 (concluding that patent misuse on the part of
Hazeltine Research does not necessarily signal an antitrust violation); Engineered Prods.
Co. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 951, 994-95 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (stating that
patent misuse may occur without finding an antitrust violation); PSC Inc. v. Symbol
Techs., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that finding an antitrust
violation is not a prerequisite for a finding of patent misuse); see also Windsurfing, Int'l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that a licensing
agreement may constitute patent misuse even if the agreement is not found per se
anticompetitive).
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would be the case with respect to an analogous antitrust claim.07
And even today the occasional district court opinion interprets
patent misuse in a much broader fashion. For example, in PSC
Inc. v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., the district court held that a
patent owner had committed misuse when it (1) required a
manufacturer of hand-held scanners to pay a royalty based on
every sale of every scan engine incorporating the patent owner's
patented technology, and (2) required a manufacturer of
scanning terminals to pay a similar royalty, even when the latter
manufacturer had purchased scan engines incorporating that
equipment from the first manufacturer. 8 In the court's view, the
patent owner had broadened the patent's scope by collecting two
royalties for the same product, in violation of the exhaustion
doctrine.' 9 This broadening produced "a strong anticompetitive
effect on the market for scan engines" because (somewhat
circularly) it resulted in a double payment;"0 the practice
"suppress[ed] competition by increasing the manufacturing cost
of a hand-held scanner or an integrated terminal when a PSC
scan engine is used in those products," thus "unfairly
restrain[ing] competition in a market that is essentially
controlled by" the patent owner."' As in Brulotte, the proposition
that the patent conferred monopoly power upon the patent owner
107. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 670 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that, for purposes of antitrust tying claims, a court must determine whether two separate
goods, as defined by consumer demand, are being tied, whereas the law of misuse "need
not look to consumer demand (which may be nonexistent), but need look only to the
nature of the claimed invention as the basis for determining whether a product is a
necessary concomitant of the invention or an entirely separate product"); 1 HOVENKAMP
ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3b.1, at 3-14 to -16 (noting that Section 271(d)(5) does not speak
to the issue of whether misuse by tying can exist if there is no market power in the
market for the tied good, but that imposing such a requirement in both antitrust and
misuse cases makes sense). On the other hand, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the court affirmed a jury verdict that a product design change
that made it more difficult for purchasers of a product covered by a patent to obtain spare
parts from anyone other than the patentee constituted a violation of Sherman Act section
2, in light of evidence that the patentee had market power for the replacement part and
that the design change actually reduced the product's technical functionality. Id. at 1381-
83. At the same time, however, the court reversed a finding that the patentee had
committed misuse on the grounds that (1) the jury instruction on misuse was too vague,
and (2) there was no evidence that the patentee's conduct constituted per se misuse or
was "not 'reasonably within the patent grant.'" Id. at 1372-73 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
108. See PSC, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (holding that collecting two royalties for the
same product is patent misuse). But see Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 210-12
(D.D.C. 2006) (distinguishing PSC because Minebea did not "pay for the same patent
rights on the same products").
109. PSC, 26 F. Supp. 2d. at 510.
110. Id. at 510-11.
111. Id. at 511.
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appears to have been assumed, rather than proven; the court
offered no explanation for why it is any more anticompetitive to
extract a single monopoly profit from two parties (or over two
time periods, as in Brulotte) than to extract it from one."2 Finally,
it remains the case that one need not prove standing or injury to
assert patent misuse,"' and the remedy remains unenforceability
of the patent until purgation-potentially a more substantial
penalty than even treble damages. The Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit therefore are probably correct when they state
that misuse goes beyond antitrust."4 Exactly how far, however,
still remains a bit uncertain.
Whatever the current state of patent misuse may be, it is
clear that copyright misuse, as currently understood by several
circuit courts,"' goes well beyond the contours of antitrust law.
One of the first opinions to clearly recognize and validate a
copyright misuse defense is the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds."' Lasercomb owned the
112. Intuitively, one might expect that a patent owner in such circumstances might
be able to exploit information asymmetries and thus succeed in extracting two profits; but
if the second manufacturer was willing to pay in effect a "double" royalty, why not simply
charge him as much in the first instance? The more likely explanation is, once again, price
discrimination. Scan engines incorporated into the second manufacturer's product may be
more valuable than scan engines incorporated into other products. In effect, the patent
owner was extracting two different tariffs, depending on the end use of the product.
113. Cf Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(holding that, in private antitrust litigation, plaintiff must prove it has suffered, or is
threatened with, "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent"). There
also is no necessary connection between the amount of harm suffered by the victims of the
misuse and the penalty imposed upon the patentee-namely, the loss of the right to
enforce the patent. See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the
Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1616-17 (1990) (arguing that the remedy in
a patent misuse ruling does not necessarily correlate to the infringement). Professor
Lemley no longer believes that the misuse doctrine should be abolished in its entirety,
and he may be right, but the preceding point is still a valid one. See Mark A. Lemley,
Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 111, 152 n.188 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Beyond Preemption] (acknowledging that
application of patent misuse may be appropriate in certain situations).
114. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969)
(stating that, when there is patent misuse, "it does not necessarily follow that the misuse
embodies the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act"); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating misuse is "a
broader wrong than antitrust violation because of the economic power that may be
derived from the patentee's right to exclude," and that it "may arise when the conditions
of antitrust violation are not met"); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The concept of patent misuse arose to restrain practices that did not in
themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right,
and thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy.").
115. There are no Supreme Court cases on point.
116. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1990). A
district court opinion from 1948 appears to be the very first case to recognize a copyright
misuse defense, holding that members of ASCAP violated the Sherman Act and
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copyright in a computer-assisted die-making software program,
Interact, which it licensed on condition that licensees not develop
or market their own computer-assisted die-making software
during the term of the agreement, ninety-nine years.'17 One of the
licensees, Reynolds, failed to sign the agreement (a fact that
Lasercomb apparently overlooked) and then proceeded to copy
the program for the purpose of creating and marketing its own
nearly identical program." 8 The Fourth Circuit reversed a
judgment in favor of Lasercomb on the ground of copyright
misuse,"9 characterizing the license Reynolds had declined to
execute as "anticompetitive,""' as an "attempt[] to suppress any
attempt by the licensee to independently implement the idea
which Interact expresses," 2' and as an "attempt to use its
copyright... to control competition in an area outside the
copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture."'22
Perhaps more importantly, the court rejected the lower court's
recourse to antitrust's rule of reason"-thereby apparently
concluding that the license constituted misuse per se-or any
close connection to antitrust at all, stating that "[tihe question is
not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of
antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is
'reasonable'), but whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright."'24
Several other courts followed suit in the wake of Lasercomb.
For example, the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI
committed copyright misuse by fixing prices and monopolizing the market for musical
works integrated into motion pictures. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843,
849-50 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949) (per curiam). A
few other decisions prior to Lasercomb arguably implicitly recognized a misuse defense.
See Roger Arar, Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1304-05
(1981); Meg Dolan, Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse Is Unnecessary 10 & n.57
(Dec. 4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Houston Law Review).
117. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 971, 973, 978.
118. Id. at 971, 973.
119. See id. at 979 ("We think the anticompetitive language in Lasercomb's licensing
agreement... amounts to misuse of its copyright.").
120. Id. at 978.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 979.
123. Id. at 977.
124. Id. at 978. As my colleague Dan Gifford has suggested, it is as if the copyright
courts have completely ignored the development of patent misuse law since Morton Salt.
See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging Solution
to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 368-69 (2002) (discussing the
"judicial assault on tying arrangements").
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Technologies, Inc. ,125 held that an agreement requiring licensees
of the plaintiffs operating systems software to use the software
only in conjunction with hardware manufactured by the plaintiff
constituted misuse126-while at the same time, holding evidence
of the plaintiffs power over a properly defined market was
insufficient to support the defendant's counterclaim for violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 7 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
held in Practice Management Information Corp. v. American
Medical Ass'n121 that the American Medical Association (AMA)
committed misuse by authorizing a federal agency, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA), to 'use, copy, publish[,]
and distribute' the AMA's copyrighted medical procedure codes
(referred to as the "CPT") for use in administering Medicare and
Medicaid claim forms, only on the condition that the HCFA agree
"'not to use any other system of procedure nomenclature.. 
. for
reporting physicians' services. '' 12 9 The court found the "adverse
effects" of this exclusivity requirement to be "apparent" because
they "gave the AMA a substantial and unfair advantage over its
competitors"' 3°-even though there was "no evidence that anyone
wishing to use the CPT has any difficulty obtaining access to
it,"'13 that the AMA's copyright posed any "realistic threat to
public access", 32 or "stifle[d] independent creative expression in
the medical coding industry,"33 or that the AMA had violated the
antitrust laws. 34
125. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 777. There is some confusion in the court's analysis. Although it describes
the licensing provision as the basis for misuse, the court goes on to state that the
defendant, to ensure that the hardware it was developing would be compatible with the
plaintiffs operating systems software, had to reverse engineer the software. Id. at 793-94
("If [Alcatel] is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from
developing a competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.").
Although this reasoning suggests the fair use analysis developed in cases such as Sega
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992), might have been
dispositive of some aspects of the plaintiffs copyright claim, even in the absence of the
misuse defense, the Alcatel court did not discuss fair use. Note also that the licensing
agreement at issue did not, as in Lasercomb, obligate licensees to forgo the independent
development of their own software, but the court concluded this fact was irrelevant.
Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 793-94.
127. Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 783-84.
128. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 517 (omission in original).
130. Id. at 521.
131. Id. at 519.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 520 n.8 (concluding that the merger doctrine did not apply).
134. Id. at 521 ("We agree with the Fourth Circuit that a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse
defense.").
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Most interesting, perhaps, is the Seventh Circuit's allusion
to the doctrine in Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc.' At issue was an attempt on the part of the
defendant WIREdata, a company that serviced real estate
brokers, to obtain information concerning properties located in
several towns in southeastern Wisconsin."6  The towns
themselves collected this information for purposes of property-tax
assessments from independent contractor assessors who coded
the information using a program developed by Assessment
Technologies (AT).'37 Each time an assessor used the program,
the program created a copyrightable compilation of data
organized into 34 master categories and 456 subcategories, but
the raw data themselves consisted only of uncopyrightable
facts.13 When WIREdata sought the data from the municipalities
under Wisconsin's open-records law, AT filed suit to enjoin
WIREdata from inducing the towns to infringe AT's copyright.9
The district court granted the injunction, but the Seventh
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, reversed.4 0 The principal
ground for reversal was that AT's copyright extended only to the
original aspects of its compilation, but not to the raw data, and
therefore there could be no infringement for merely supplying
those data.14 ' But the court went on to make two further
observations, one relating to fair use and one to misuse. First,
the court cited Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. ,142 for the
proposition that fair use would shield the municipalities if it
135. Assessment Techs. ofWis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc, 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
136. Id. at 642.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 642-43.
139. Id. at 642.
140. Id. at 642, 648.
141. Id. at 644. Copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship, fixed
in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Copyright does not
subsist in facts, but it may subsist in a compilation that selects or arranges facts in a
manner that demonstrates at least minimal creativity. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(defining "compilation"); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (distinguishing between facts and factual
compilations). Thus, one who copies only individual facts from a copyrighted compilation,
but none of the original selection or arrangement, does not infringe the compilation
copyright. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. In Assessment Technologies, the selection of facts
appears to have been comprehensive, and therefore not original, but AT's arrangement in
accordance with its 456 subcategories probably demonstrated sufficient creativity to
satisfy the originality requirement. All that WIREdata wanted to copy, however, were the
facts themselves, not the categories. Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 644.
142. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
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were impossible for them to extract the uncopyrightable data
without copying the compilation's copyrightable arrangement.
4
1
Alternatively, the court asserted that any attempt by AT to use
its software license, which arguably forbade the towns from
disseminating any data collected with the use of the program, so
as to prevent them "from revealing their own data.., might
constitute copyright misuse. "14 The court noted that there was no
evidence that AT possessed market power, but it concluded that
this did not matter:
The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the
bounds of antitrust... is that for a copyright owner to use
an infringement suit to obtain property protection, here in
data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to
force a settlement or achieve an outright victory over an
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process."'
This conclusion made for a startling contrast with Judge
Posner's thoughts on misuse as expressed twenty-one years
146
earlier in a patent case, USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,
in which he had questioned the viability of an independent role
for patent misuse:
If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust
principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law
is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse;
and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without
in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to
debilitating uncertainty.
47
Judge Posner elaborates upon his current "abuse of process"
theory at greater length in a recent article. 48 Two recent district
court decisions point in opposite directions on the question of
whether filing bogus lawsuits can be a form of misuse.49
143. Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 644-45.
144. Id. at 642, 646-47.
145. Id. at 647.
146. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
147. Id. at 512. Judge Posner quoted this dictum with approval in a later case,
upholding the validity of a no-contest clause in a copyright licensing agreement. Saturday
Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987).
148. See William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1654-59 (2004) (discussing the problem of
overclaiming and copyright misuse).
149. Compare Adv. Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fasteners, Inc., No. 98-CV-7766
(PAC), 2006 WL 3342655, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (holding that enforcement of a
patent knowing it to be invalid or not infringed does not constitute misuse), with
Huthwaite, Inc. v. Randstad Gen. Partner (US), L.L.C., No. 06-C-1548, 2006 WL 3065470,
at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2006) (stating that "mere filing of a copyright infringement
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Nevertheless, it is hardly the case that the misuse defense
has always succeeded, even among courts that have been willing
to concede its existence. For example, in Triad Systems Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co.,150 the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that a software manufacturer's licensing of its software
on condition that licensees not duplicate the software or allow it
to be used by third parties-a restriction that effectively made it
impossible for independent service organizations to service
Triad's customers' computers-constituted misuse."' This result
is consistent with a narrow, but mainstream, interpretation of
the Supreme Court's antitrust decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc. "'-though curiously, not with the
Ninth Circuit's own more expansive interpretation of that
decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court.'
Similarly, in Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entertainment, Inc. ,""' the declaratory judgment plaintiff argued
(unsuccessfully) that the fair use doctrine shielded it from
liability for making available, without permission of the
defendant copyright owners, two-minute "clip previews" of the
defendants' motion pictures and that, in the alternative, the
lawsuit is not grounds for a copyright misuse claim," but that an allegation that the
plaintiff "is attempting to use its copyrighted books to cover the unprotectible ideas within
those books by filing copyright infringement lawsuits and forcing companies such as
Randstad to either settle or incur litigation expenses" properly raises the misuse defense).
150. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
151. Id. at 1336-37. To put the matter in perspective, the Copyright Act permits the
owner of a lawfully made copy of software to duplicate the software if the resulting copy
constitutes "an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and.. . is used in no other manner." 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000). Licensees,
however, as opposed to owners, do not have this right; according to an earlier Ninth
Circuit decision, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-19 (9th
Cir. 1993), merely running a lawfully made copy of computer software without permission
of the copyright owner creates an infringing copy of the software, absent an applicable
exception. In 1998, however, Congress added a new provision, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000),
which permits the owner or lessee of a computer to make copies of software for the
purpose of maintenance or repair-effectively overruling MAI Systems Corp. and Triad on
this point. See Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,
§ 302, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 117).
152. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992)
("It may be that [Kodak's] parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified
market, or that the equipment market does discipline the aftermarkets so that all three
are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive effects of Kodak's behavior
are outweighed by its competitive effects.").
153. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20
(9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a jury verdict that the defendant lacked a legitimate business
justification for its unilateral refusal to license its intellectual property and therefore was
liable for monopolization under Sherman Act section 2).
154. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir.
2003).
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defendants had engaged in misuse."' The alleged misuse took the
form of agreements with companies that sought permission to
display authorized movie trailers on their websites, to the effect
that these companies' websites would not be 'derogatory to or
critical of the entertainment industry,"' or (more specifically) of
the defendants or their films."' Citing with approval the evolving
case law on copyright misuse, the Third Circuit suggested that
misuse may exist when the copyright owner has entered into
anticompetitive agreements, or sought to stifle the exercise of the
fair use or merger doctrines, 5 7 as well as perhaps even in other
cases in which the owner seeks to "leverage its copyright to
restrain the creative expression of another without engaging in
anticompetitive behavior or implicating the fair use and
idea/expression doctrines. " "'5 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the agreements at issue were not "likely to interfere with
creative expression to such a degree that they affect in any
significant way the policy interest in increasing the public store
of creative activity," noting (1) that licensees were free to offer
criticism "on other websites or elsewhere"; (2) the lack of
evidence that the public would find it more difficult to obtain
criticism of Disney from other sources; (3) the possibility that the
fair use doctrine itself would override the licensing restriction;
and (4) the concern that an overly broad application of the
misuse doctrine "would likely decrease the public's access to
Disney's works because it might as a result refuse to license at
all online display of its works."' Finally, although the majority
of courts that have recognized the copyright misuse defense
appear to follow Lasercomb and the patent misuse decisions in
not requiring the defendant itself to be a victim of the misuse,
there is a significant plurality of decisions that require some sort
of "nexus" between the IP plaintiffs alleged misconduct and the
IP dispute at issue.6 °
155. Id. at 194.
156. Id. at 203.
157. Id. at 204-05.
158. Id. at 205-06 (stating also that "[a] copyright holder's attempt to restrict
expression that is critical of it (or of its copyrighted good, or the industry in which it
operates, etc.) may, in context, subvert-as do anti-competitive restrictions-a copyright's
policy goal to encourage the creation and dissemination to the public of creative activity").
159. Id. at 206.
160. See Int'l Motor Contest Ass'n v. Staley, 434 F. Supp. 2d 650, 668-69 (N.D. Iowa
2006) (surveying the case law and concluding that the Eighth Circuit would likely follow
the majority view and not require a nexus). Perhaps if the misuse defense were raised
more frequently, however, more courts would insist upon some sort of nexus requirement.
There have been a few reported decisions, for example, when Microsoft filed suit for
copyright infringement and the defendant asserted the defense of copyright misuse, with
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In summary, the misuse defense as it exists today seems a
bit schizophrenic. On the one hand, the patent misuse cases
(mostly, though not entirely) apply antitrust standards to
determine whether a given restraint constitutes misuse. Even so,
there is to date no clear articulation why it is desirable to accord
even this narrow misuse defense to persons who are themselves
not victims of the restraint, or why, if the facts make out an
antitrust violation, relegating the victim to an antitrust remedy
is insufficient. In the copyright context, some courts have
enthusiastically embraced what I have referred to elsewhere as
an "antitrust lite" standard,' though without clearly articulating
why copyrights should be rendered unenforceable when their
owners engage in conduct that falls short of an antitrust
violation. Some courts have extended the defense to
circumstances not implicating competition issues as such, while
others have attempted to narrow it by applying an ill-defined
nexus requirement. This chaos suggests some need for theoretical
clarity. Exactly what purposes should the misuse doctrine serve,
and how should the doctrine be implemented? In the following
Part, I suggest some answers to these questions and some
implications for some current controversies.
III. REIMAGINING MISUSE
Suppose that the misuse doctrine does not currently exist, and
that the proposition under consideration is whether there ought to
be some penalty imposed upon copyright and patent owners who
use their IPRs in an objectionable fashion. To state the proposition
in this way almost assumes its answer: surely we should discourage
the misuse comprising Microsoft's unrelated antitrust violations (which did, after all,
involve Microsoft's use of its copyrightable software) in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Some courts have permitted the defense to go forward;
others have not. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp.
2d 966, 997 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding defendant's allegations that plaintiff record
companies had engaged in price fixing and concerted refusals to deal did not implicate the
misuse doctrine because, even if true, such conduct "would not have extended Plaintiffs'
copyrights into ideas or expressions over which they have no legal monopoly"-in other
words, defendants must prove the existence of a nexus). Compare Microsoft Corp. v.
Jesse's Computers & Repair, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 681, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (requiring a nexus
between the infringing conduct and the purported misuse), Microsoft Corp. v. Computer
Support Servs. of Carolina, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (same), and
Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distr., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 800, 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(same), with Microsoft Corp. v. Fredenburg, No. 05-CV-1710, 2006 WL 752985, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2006) (rejecting any nexus requirement, although it is unclear whether
the defendant was relying upon conduct at issue in United States v. Microsoft or upon
some other unrelated conduct).
161. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 544 (2006).
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people from "misusing" their IPRs! As soon as we answer the
question affirmatively, however, several difficult follow-up
questions immediately rise to the surface. Should we penalize
owners for using their IPRs to commit antitrust violations, for
example-or to violate other laws, for that matter?62 Should we
penalize them for attempting to "broaden the scope of the grant"? If
so, what exactly does this mean-how can we tell when a patent or
copyright is being put to such ends? Should there be other
conditions present, such as the use of the IPR to achieve an
anticompetitive purpose (and what exactly does that mean?), or
does any attempted broadening merit a penalty? Assuming we can
reach consensus on these substantive issues, further questions arise
with respect to procedure and enforcement: what should the penalty
be, and how should it be enforced? Should nonvictims be allowed to
assert misuse as a defense to an infringement claim, or should there
be a "nexus" or standing requirement?
The answers to these questions depend upon two underlying
inquiries. The first involves defining the conduct that might,
162. Most contemporary observers contend that copyright subsists even in obscene or
illegal or fraudulent works, and that any penalties flowing from the publication of such
works is independent of copyright. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 856, 862 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In our view, the absence of content
restrictions on copyrightability indicates that Congress has decided that the
constitutional goal of encouraging creativity would not be best served if an author had to
concern himself not only with the marketability of his work but also with the judgment of
government officials regarding the worth of the work."); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.17, at 2-197 (2007) (describing Mitchell Bros. as
expressing "the currently prevailing view" with respect to copyright in obscene works,
despite some older cases to the contrary). But see Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F.
Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("It strains credulity that Congress intended to extend
the protection of the copyright law to contraband."). Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has largely confined the "moral utility" doctrine, which at one time
prevented the patenting of immoral or fraudulent inventions, to oblivion, see Juicy Whip,
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999), though it may retain
some vitality with respect to a small class of inventions the practice of which would
violate fundamental public policy. See Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods § 5, art 27, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
81, 94 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] ("Members may exclude from patentability inventions,
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.. . ."); Mikyung Kim, An Overview
of the Regulation and Patentability of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research
in the United States and Anti-Cloning Legislation in South Korea, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 645, 708 (2005) (summarizing the current state of the
morality doctrine and noting that "the USPTO appears to be willing to invoke the
morality doctrine in determining utility of any invention pertaining to human material").
So one puzzle is why the use of intellectual property to subvert competition policy should
render the IPR unenforceable, when its use for other illegal purposes does not. But cf
Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 864 n.25 (distinguishing the patent misuse cases on the
ground that, unlike cases involving assertions of copyright in obscene works, the IP
owner's conduct threatened to subvert patent policy).
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even potentially, constitute misuse. Is the IP owner's exercise of
her rights something that the law should discourage, and if so,
why? The second involves devising a remedy and an enforcement
mechanism. The choice of remedies could range from merely
declining to enforce an offending contract provision, on the one
hand, to the partial or complete unenforceability of the IPR, on
the other-with perhaps some intermediate options as well. The
choice of remedy, in turn, may determine who has standing to
assert the defense; if the remedy is limited to the
unenforceability of an offending provision, it probably makes
little sense to confer standing on a nonparty to the contract
containing that provision. Moreover, the two inquiries may be
related-the more expansive the penalties and enforcement
mechanisms for misuse, the narrower we may want the
definition of misuse to be, and vice versa.
Section A develops a theoretical framework for defining
misuse and for evaluating assertions of the misuse defense. The
principal focus will be upon assertions of misuse arising from IP
transactions, and for this reason will be referred to, from time to
time, as transactional misuse. Section B then applies the
analysis developed in Section A to some current controversies.
Section C discusses related issues of standing, remedies, and
misuse arising from bad faith assertions of IPRs (litigation
misuse). By way of summary, I will argue, among other things,
that transactional misuse should be defined as encompassing a
narrow class of practices that are likely to give rise to a surfeit of
social costs over benefits, and only in rare instances should
depart from antitrust standards; that the remedy for
transactional misuse should be limited to unenforceability of the
challenged contractual provision, in which case misuse effectively
merges into preemption doctrine, and that this reform should
result in the elimination of nonparty standing; but that
unenforceability of the IPR should remain one possible remedy,
though probably not the exclusive remedy, for litigation misuse.
A. Defining Misuse
A first approximation of the substance of misuse, given its
frequent invocation in cases involving purported threats to
competition, would be to equate it with an antitrust violation. As
so defined, misuse may take a variety of forms, from a conspiracy
to fix prices of copyrighted sound recordings, to illegal tie-ins and
exclusive dealing or distributorship arrangements, to (rarely)
monopolization offenses. An obvious question, however, is why
there is a need for a doctrine that defines misuse as conduct that
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is identical to an antitrust violation, as long as an infringement
defendant who is the victim of the antitrust offense could simply
file a claim or counterclaim for violation of the antitrust laws.
The only plausible reasons to have a misuse doctrine in addition
to antitrust law, if the substantive content of the two is the same,
would be (1) to permit someone who does not have antitrust
standing or cannot prove antitrust injury to challenge the
conduct at issue, or (2) to create an additional penalty (such as
unenforceability of the IPR) in addition to the antitrust sanction.
If such reforms to competition policy are deemed desirable,
however, the more obvious path would be to loosen antitrust
law's strictures on antitrust standing and remedies, rather than
to do so indirectly and perhaps haphazardly by way of the misuse
doctrine. Indeed, the application of misuse doctrine as a way of
indirectly reforming antitrust law, assuming such reform is
desirable, would be grossly underinclusive, insofar as it would
apply only to conduct involving the assertion of IPRs and not
other property or contract rights. But at least the substance of
the misuse doctrine would be relatively easy to gauge if misuse
were simply equated with a violation of antitrust law.
Determining whether specific conduct violates the antitrust laws
is hardly a trivial undertaking, to be sure, but there is a vast
body of precedent and commentary to guide the inquiry in most
instances.
The more interesting substantive question is whether, as the
courts continue to assert, misuse may consist of conduct that
does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation. At a highly
abstract, theoretical level, one might imagine that some sort of
defense ought to be available in cases in which a court is
convinced that a finding of infringement liability would impose
greater social costs than social benefits. Many IP doctrines
already can be viewed as embodying a rough cost/benefit
calculation, but perhaps misuse could play some sort of backup
role for situations in which case-by-case adjustments seem
appropriate. For example, one might postulate that the
nonobviousness doctrine in patent law reflects a rough
estimation that the cost of conferring patent protection on some
inventions-those that qualify as "obvious" under the applicable
criteria-outweighs the social benefit. Perhaps "misuse" could
serve a backup role by enabling courts to render unenforceable
patents on inventions that qualify as nonobvious under the
applicable nonobviousness criteria, but that nevertheless should
be unenforceable due to a perceived surplus of social costs over
social benefits in a particular case. As so described, however, the
doctrine would probably have few advocates, conferring as it
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would such unfettered discretion upon judges that it would lead
to unpredictable and inconsistent results. Moreover, given that
Congress has seen fit to create patent and copyright rights
subject to various criteria, it might seem to conflict with rule-of-
law virtues for the courts to undo that bargain on the basis of
their own seat-of-the-pants second-guessing. And intuition might
seem to suggest that if there is to be a misuse doctrine of some
sort, misuse should rest upon a finding of misconduct and not
simply the assertion of possibly welfare-reducing, but lawfully
procured, IPRs.
Thus, if we are trying to find a plausible role for misuse that
goes beyond antitrust confines but does not dissolve into some
sort of free-floating "get out of jail free" card, we need to be more
precise about the conditions that might conceivably give rise to a
finding of misuse. One characteristic that most of the litigated
misuse cases seem to have in common is that the IP owner is
allegedly using its IP to extract concessions from another party:
conditioning access to the IP, for example, on the buyer's or
licensee's promise to buy or license something else from the IP
owner, or not to buy or license a competing product from another
party, or not to engage in some conduct that would otherwise be
lawful such as resale or some other use of the product embodying
the IPR.'63 To be sure, a decision to consider the doctrine anew
163. This is a somewhat narrower conception of misuse than that urged
(unsuccessfully) by the defendant in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d
at 997, or by the defendants in the Microsoft cases discussed supra at note 160. In these
cases, the defendants alleged that anticompetitive conduct involving the plaintiffs'
copyrights-for example, horizontal agreements to fix the prices of copyright royalties-
rendered those copyrights unenforceable. I suppose that such conduct might be viewed as
an extraction of concessions with respect to price or other matters, although it seems
quite different from the concessions I focus on above for a couple of reasons. First, in a
case such as Grokster, the alleged anticompetitive conduct is concerted, rather than a
unilateral effort to extract a concession from a licensee. As such, it has less to do with
expanding the scope of the IP grant than with violating other legal norms. Second, in
Microsoft, much of the anticompetitive conduct was unilateral, but its relation to
copyright seems a bit strained. Microsoft certainly owns copyright rights in its software,
and it can even be viewed as having attempted to expand the scope of its copyright grant
by asserting the spurious right to prevent modifications that would not amount to the
creation of unlawful derivative works. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62-64
(outlining Microsoft's justifications for the license restrictions); Herbert Hovenkamp et al.,
Unilateral Refusals to License in the US, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND
US PERSPECTIVES 35-36 (Howard Shelanski & Frangois LvCque eds., 2005). But
arguably very little of the government's antitrust case against Microsoft depends upon the
existence or nonexistence of copyright in Microsoft's code. Trade secret and contract rights
alone might have sufficed to enable Microsoft to engage in the unlawful maintenance of
its monopoly.
In a recent paper focusing on copyright misuse, Professors John Cross and Peter
Yu have classified "copyright abuse" cases into four types: "(1) use of copyright to exact
concessions from the licensee; (2) dealings that limit others' ability to compete;
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need not entail fealty to these existing decisions. But perhaps
this common feature provides a useful starting point for trying to
sketch out what a rational version of (transactional) misuse that
goes beyond antitrust strictures might resemble. In other words,
let us consider provisionally a regime under which misuse exists
when the IP owner uses its IP to extract concessions that we
believe, on policy grounds, should not be extracted. Why might
we wish to restrict IP owners from extracting some concessions
from their purchasers and licensees?
The obvious, though not entirely satisfying, answer that
existing misuse doctrine suggests is that we want to prevent IP
owners from extracting concessions that go beyond the scope of
the IP grant. This answer presupposes, naturally enough, that
the law fixes the scope of the grant in some fashion, but that in
some instances it is possible for IP owners to transgress those
boundaries-rather as if the state had accorded me a plot of land,
and I purported to assert dominion and control over some
adjacent plot as well. And in some meaningful sense this
presupposition must be true. Congress fixes the scope, breadth,
and duration of IPRs, presumably with some goal, either
instrumental or deontological (or some combination thereof), in
mind. The law thus tells the patent or copyright owner, in other
words, "you may do this" (e.g., you may enjoin someone from
making your patented invention or copying your copyrighted
material, absent permission or an applicable exception), but "you
may not do that" (e.g., you may not enjoin someone from making
an invention that contains fewer than all of the elements of your
patented invention, or from using facts or ideas expressed in the
user's own words). Thus our provisional definition of "misuse"
(3) restriction of the licensee's ability to deal with the copyright owner's competitors; and
(4) groundless claims made by the copyright owner." John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu,
Competition Law and Copyright Misuse 5 (Mich. St. U. College of Law Legal Studies
Research, Research Paper No. 04-29, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=986891.
The classification scheme I employ in this paper would probably group the first three types of
possible abuse identified by Cross and Yu into the category of possible transactional misuse,
and the last as litigation misuse. The first and third of Cross and Yu's types can both be
thought of as efforts on the part of the IP owner to extract concessions; the second does not fit
as comfortably into this pigeonhole, as noted in the preceding paragraph of this footnote. See
Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 623, 669-83 (2002) (arguing that a patentee's refusal to license its patent on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, after having successfully urged the technology
covered by that patent to be adopted as an industry standard without first having disclosed the
patent's existence, should be considered misuse). But cf In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, slip op.
at 118-19 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), available at http'/www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/





might be restated such that misuse occurs when the patent or
copyright owner attempts to transgress these boundaries, i.e., to
assert patent or copyright rights beyond the limits the law has
set. Notice that, under this definition, it may not matter whether
the "broadening" of the IPR results in any anticompetitive
result-that is, in some result (such as increase in price or
reduction in output) that would be of concern to antitrust
enforcers.
The preceding definition is far from perfect, however, for
several reasons. Most obviously, it begs the question of what the
relevant boundaries are. Although there are a few relatively
clear boundaries set forth in the applicable statutes-patent and
copyright terms, for example, are usually not hard to
calculate' 65-there is more frequently a substantial gray area
within which it is unclear whether one's IPRs extend. Although
the claims of a patent are often described as the "metes and
bounds"'66 of the invention, IPRs don't come with metes and
bounds in any literal sense; determining whether a given
invention falls within the literal scope of those claims is often a
difficult task, as any patent lawyer will attest.'67 Determining the
scope of a copyright is even more difficult, because there is
nothing analogous to a patent claim that defines the outer limits
of the work of authorship. At the margin, no one can clearly
demarcate the line between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable idea, as Judge Learned Hand observed many
164. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1849 (1984) (arguing that commentators, "[bly assuming the existence of a
background standard of the appropriate scope of patent exploitation..., simply beg the
question of determining which practices should be allowed"); Note, Clarifying the
Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values,
104 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1991) ("The Supreme Court in Morton Salt and its progeny
has defined patent misuse simply as an extension of the patentee's monopoly beyond the
lawful 'scope' of the patent grant and applied the doctrine with little elaboration of what
marks the boundaries of the patent 'monopoly.'" (footnote omitted)).
165. Though even here there are exceptions: the standard copyright term today, for
works other than works made for hire, subsists from the creation of the work until
seventy years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). For works made for hire,
however, the term can begin on the date of publication, 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000), but
calculating when this date occurs is sometimes less than clear. See Thomas F. Cotter,
Towards a Functional Definition of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), (manuscript at 4-5, 9-11), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1019263. Calculating the term for works published prior to January 1, 1978,
evinces similar difficulties.
166. E.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Linn, J., dissenting).
167. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) ("Infringement is often difficult to determine....").
938 [44:4
2007] MISUSE 939
years ago in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.'68 Worse yet, our
instincts concerning what lies "beyond the scope" may tend to
elevate form over substance. Just as it seems intuitively
plausible that tying can increase monopoly profits, it seems
plausible that certain types of licenses can expand the scope of
one's IPRs; however, economic analysis suggests that our
intuitions can be wrong.169  Inquiry should focus less on
appearances and more on the substantive question of whether,
for example, enforcing a given contractual restriction would
defeat the purposes of the patent or copyright laws-in which
case, however, one needs first to define those purposes.
A few purposes immediately suggest themselves. One
might be concern about inequality of bargaining power, or
some other vulnerability on the part of users and licensees.
Some sought-after concessions may seem substantively unfair,
168. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("Nobody
has even been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.").
169. Cases such as Brulotte and Lasercomb can be viewed as involving expansions of
IPRs only in the sense that licensees agreed to continue paying royalties, or not to engage
in certain conduct, after the date on which the plaintiffs' IPRs expired. But those
agreements had no effect on third parties, who were free to practice the patent or
copyright at will upon the expiration of the government-granted term. Brulotte in
particular also has been widely criticized for invalidating an efficient method for financing
the licensing of patents. See, e.g., 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3b3, at 3-26 to -
28 ("If a patent gives its owner power in a relevant economic market, a long-term royalty
agreement may effectively 'lock in' licensees to use the patented technology even after the
patent expires .... Such circumstances do not justify a per se prohibition on term
extensions, however. Rather, the categorical treatment of term extensions under patent
misuse seems to be driven by noneconomic concerns about the use of patent law to gain
some perceived economic advantage."); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 380-81, 417-18 (2003)
(describing Brulotte as "one of the all-time economically dumb Supreme Court decisions");
Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,
97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1026-27 (1999) (arguing "the Court's concern with leverage was
misplaced" because constant royalty payments spread beyond the life of the patent are
economically reasonable for both parties). Similar critiques might be raised against
arguments that restraints conditioning access to an IPR upon the user's agreement to buy
or license some aftermarket product or service expand the scope of the copyright grant,
see 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 162, § 13.09[A] [3] [a], at 13-301, despite the fact that
they do so only in a very formalistic sense and are anticompetitive only in the (most
likely) uncommon setting in which monopoly leveraging is a plausible outcome. See supra
notes 97-101 and accompanying text. To the extent such restraints facilitate price
discrimination, see infra notes 194-97, 211-13 and accompanying text, their
enforceability should turn on the desirability (or not) of enabling such discrimination.
In the wake of Brulotte, parties should structure their transactions so that all
royalties attributable to the patent are paid before the end of the term. The rational
response for potential licensors is to demand more money up front so that the present
value of the income stream is the same as it would have been under a pre-Brulotte license;
depending on the cost of credit, however, licensees may prefer the option of making
smaller payments over a longer term.
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or may conflict with distributive justice goals. These concerns
usually would not be viewed as a very good reason for
intervention from a purely economic perspective, but in theory
might nevertheless be compelling under some circumstances. 170
Second, from a more utilitarian standpoint, interpreting the
boundaries of IP protection too expansively might entail an
excess of social costs in relation to social benefits. The
theoretical costs and benefits of IP protection have been
discussed at length elsewhere. "' For now, we need merely note
that the benefits may include the creation and publication of
new inventions and works of authorship, as well as the
reduction in costs attributable to less reliance on other forms
of protection such as self-help.'72 Invention and works of
authorship, in turn, are valuable not only for their immediate
utilitarian ability to satisfy preferences but also for their
contribution to the store of human knowledge and (particularly
in the case of works of authorship) self-governance and
creative autonomy.'73 At the same time, the costs can include
not only transaction costs but also the costs attributable to
deadweight loss due to monopoly, among other things.'74 The
optimal IP system would maximize the surplus of social
benefits over social costs. While no one knows where the
optimal point lies, in theory one might be able to make an
educated guess in a particular case whether an interpretation
of the scope of IPRs in one direction or another is likely to
move toward or away from that hypothetical point. An
expansion of the scope of IPRs beyond this hypothetical
balance, even if embodied in a bilateral bargained-for contract,
170. For example, if we view fair use as embodying distributional goals, an effort to
coerce a waiver of fair use rights might be deemed misuse. See Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1543-45 (2005)
(suggesting fair use may confer distributive benefits by exempting users from having to
pay for content in some situations in which ability to pay constrains willingness to pay).
But maybe this could come within the social externalities rationale too, if anything counts
in the utilitarian calculus.
171. See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COWTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 13-20, 30-32 (2005) ("The
fundamental premise of the patent system is that society benefits when people conceive of
new inventions .... The difficult question is how to maximize these social benefits.").
172. Id. at 13-14.
173. See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 374 (2005)
("[Tihe more diverse memes there are, the greater the likelihood that consumers will find
the memes that satisfy their preferences; the deeper the resources upon which they can
draw when making important decisions; and the better able they will be to find their true
selves.").




may undermine important third party interests, including the
interest in protecting future innovation (dynamic efficiency).175
Seen in this light, there is a theoretical case for
characterizing some efforts to extract concessions as going
beyond the scope of the grant. The inquiry might even be thought
of as taking the form of a conditional probability, where the
"given" is the congressional judgment, to which courts should
defer, that a lawfully procured IPR in general generates more
benefits than costs or is otherwise justified on the basis of public
policy. Under this view, a court should find misuse only when it
is probable that the social costs of permitting the IP owner to
extract a specific concession outweigh the social benefits, given
the assumed fact that the exercise of the IPR at issue in general
generates more benefits than costs. All IPRs, in other words,
potentially can give rise to static deadweight losses (even though
many do not do so in practice) and to other social costs, including
costs to dynamic efficiency 76 or to freedom of speech.'77 In
175. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1192-
94 (1995) (arguing that misuse doctrine may be better tailored than antitrust to account
for harm to innovation); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law
Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 927-30 (2000) (arguing that misuse doctrine should come into
play in some cases in which restraints undermine public policy, such as by unduly
inhibiting innovation, even if they fall short of violating antitrust law); Ramsey Hanna,
Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV.
401, 423-24 (1994) (arguing antitrust does not sufficiently account for harm to long-term
innovation, but the misuse doctrine can); Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1934-36 (1997) (arguing potential harm to innovation markets
may justify application of patent misuse in some cases, but noting the difficulty of
applying this insight in practice).
176. Cotter, supra note 161, at 492.
177. Several commentators have proposed that copyright misuse may fill a gap in
cases in which copyright owners attempt to prohibit users from accessing uncopyrightable
facts or ideas (as in Assessment Technologies), or from engaging in fair uses that promote
free speech interests. See JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse
to Protect Digital Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 85 (2004) (arguing these
cases are more likely "to silence speakers who are engaged in criticism rather than
economic piracy"); Patry & Posner, supra note 148, at 1658-59 (arguing for invocation of
misuse where a copyright holder overenforces "to the prejudice of publishers of public
domain works"); Note, supra note 164, at 1303 (arguing that a "public interest ... in the
free flow of ideas... may be harmed even if the infringement plaintiffs conduct does not
threaten to undermine competitive conditions"); Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking
Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 930-31 (2004) (arguing "that copyright misuse
should protect the values embodied in the First Amendment"). An interesting question-
and one to which I do not, as of yet, propose a conclusive answer-is whether the First
Amendment forbids the state from overriding doctrines such as fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that these
doctrines make it largely irrelevant to subject copyright laws or disputes to heightened
First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003)
(noting that "every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
2007]
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general, courts must accept these costs as the necessary tradeoff
in return for the social benefits of IP protection. But in
determining whether a specific concession falls within the
ambiguous scope of the IP grant, perhaps a court should consider
whether the marginal deadweight loss (and other costs)
attributable to the concession are likely to be justified by the
marginal increase in incentives or other social goods.17s
Permitting copyright owners, for example, to extract concessions
against fair use or first-sale rights conceivably might generate
more social costs than benefits, particularly if these rights
safeguard important third-party interests that do not factor into
the licensor's and licensee's bargaining calculus.179
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication"); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985) (observing that
"copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author's expression'"). If so, then maybe the First Amendment prohibits the
state from legislating these doctrines out of existence or even from enforcing private
contracts compelling the waiver of protections afforded under them. On the other hand, in
other contexts courts have long permitted the assertion of (limited) property rights in
ideas and facts. See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380
(2d Cir. 2000) (interpreting New York law as recognizing both property and contract
rights with respect to ideas, subject to qualifications); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting New York law as recognizing a right to
prevent others from misappropriating "hot news," subject to certain conditions); Pamela
Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First
Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 778 (2007) (offering a set of principles for mediating
the occasional tensions between First Amendment law and trade secret law). But even if
the First Amendment permits Congress or state legislatures to extend property rights
into the realm of facts and ideas, it might be sensible for courts to interpret the scope of
copyright and patent grants more narrowly, absent clear guidance that Congress intends
or would tolerate a broader construction. Professor Sprigman independently makes a very
similar argument in a recently published paper. See Christopher Sprigman, Indirect
Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 565, 568-69
(2007). Put another way, where the scope of the IP grant is ambiguous, courts may
conclude that the benefits (of construing IPRs as broadly as the IP owner asserts those
rights should be construed) do not outweigh the costs to free speech, even if courts would
defer to an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to the contrary. Or perhaps
courts should adopt a narrower construction of IPRs in light of the long-standing policy of
construing statutes so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions. See Dan L. Burk,
Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1123 (2003) (arguing the misuse
doctrine might in some instances "defus[e] explosive constitutional questions that might
otherwise require controversial rulings on vertical federalism or the scope of federal
power"). But see Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren
Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397, 401 (2005) (criticizing the canon of construing statutes so as to
avoid constitutional issues on the ground that this canon simply allows courts to rewrite
statutes to avoid difficult questions). I hope to take these questions up in greater depth in
a follow-up work.
178. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 164, at 1831 (proposing a ratio test, under which a
patentee would be permitted to engage in a practice if the ratio between the reward
accruing to the patentee and the social loss due to monopoly is sufficiently large).
179. See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text (cataloguing various social
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One additional factor that should be taken into account before
adopting a definition of misuse that focuses upon social costs and
benefits, however, is the cost of error and adjudication. How exactly
are courts to tally up social costs and benefits? How can we be sure
they will get it right, and will do so predictably and consistently?
And at what cost? These problems may not be as acute as in my
earlier example of a court overriding a finding of nonobviousness
based upon the judge's independent weighing of the costs and
benefits of enforcing the patent at issue, although surely some
substantial risk of excessive error and adjudication costs remains.
But perhaps there are ways to minimize these risks. As Professor
Hovenkamp points out in the context of antitrust law, antitrust
doctrine has evolved in ways that enable courts to avoid, under
most circumstances, actually having to weigh procompetitive
benefits against anticompetitive harms-for example, through the
use of presumptions and burden-shifting.8 s Perhaps some similar
structure can be incorporated into misuse doctrine. To illustrate, let
me suggest framing the relevant inquiry as one of determining how
far the IP owner's rights extend. The parties' competing positions
can be visualized as follows:
IP Owner: "My rights extend this far: m"
User: "No, they only extend this far: -"
benefits and costs in the context of reverse engineering). But cf. Feldman, supra note 4, at
400 (arguing that patent misuse doctrine can take into account for harms that antitrust
does not recognize, including (1) the social "waste that can occur with defensive research
or inventing around a patent, (2) the burden on innovation that can result from an
overproliferation of patent rights, and (3) the disincentives to innovation that can result
from allocating reward to early-stage inventors over late-stage inventors"). Although I
agree with Professor Feldman that misuse doctrine sometimes should be more sensitive
than antitrust to harm to innovation, I am much less sanguine than she about an
expansive role for misuse in combating the harms she lists. More generally, Feldman
makes the valid point that IPRs give rise to a variety of social costs, including but not
limited to monopoly costs; although antitrust is directed only against the latter type of
cost, IP doctrine rightly tries to minimize a wider class of costs. Feldman, supra note 4, at
438. The utility of misuse doctrine in combating these other harms, however, is in my
view nevertheless quite limited. There is nevertheless something to be said for resolving
some of these matters within IP law, rather than trying to stretch antitrust law to deal
with perceived excesses in the exercise of IPRs, as for example with abuse of dominant
position or essential facilities. See Thomas F. Cotter, Evaluating the Pro- and
Anticompetitive Effects of Intellectual Property Protection, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006,
at 1, 6 (book review), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/03/Mar6-
CotterRev3=22f.pdf (arguing that policymakers should rely on IP law to correct
anticompetitive aspects because antitrust law can be "slow, inflexible, and.., potentially
susceptible to overdeterrance").
180. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.6c, at 257 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that, "if a challenged
restraint simultaneously produces opportunities for both anticompetitive practices and
substantial efficiencies, a court must have a guide").
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The evaluation of these competing claims will depend, of
course, primarily upon the traditional tools of legal analysis-
statutory text, precedent, legislative history, and other
conventional aids to interpretation."' Assuming, however, these
tools do not determine which party is correct-in other words,
that the scope of the IP owner's rights truly are ambiguous-then
the analysis above suggests that courts must fall back onto policy
considerations to resolve the matter. To this end, one might ask
why, if at all, the law should interpret the IP owner's rights as
extending as far as she claims (for example, far enough to permit
her to extract a challenged concession).
Three categories of possible reasons for broadly construing
the scope of the IP owner's rights suggest themselves. The
remainder of this Article therefore will focus upon developing a
method for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons. The
first-and it is here that the influence of antitrust analysis can
be most plainly seen-is that permitting the owner to extract the
concession at issue may facilitate some end that could be viewed
as ancillary to the use or management of the IPR-such as
encouraging licensees to promote and advertise products that
incorporate the owner's copyright or patent, or to engage in
quality control-or as a means of reducing transaction or
monitoring costs (as was arguably the case, respectively, in
Brulotte and in Lasercomb)."8' Second, permitting the owner to
extract the concession at issue may enable her (for good or for ill,
as we shall see) to engage in a form of price discrimination. A
third possibility is that permitting the IP owner to extract the
concession serves no substantial purpose other than enriching
181. Let me be clear at this point that I am taking a position in this paper on the
question of whether precedent or legislative history do dictate any particular result with
respect to, for example, contractual waivers of first-sale or fair use rights-and, if so,
whether those rights of the IP owner vis-A-vis the licensee continue to be governed by IP
law or by contract law alone. See, e.g., Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659,
666 (1895) ("Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we
express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question
of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.");
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1282 (1995) ("Congress was explicit in the context of section 109(a) [of the Copyright Act]
that it intended for vendors who 'contract around' the first-sale doctrine to be limited to
contract remedies.").
182. In Lasercomb, for example, the restraint at issue appears to have been
motivated by the desire to prevent licensees from making unauthorized copies of the
software and marketing it for their own purposes-precisely the conduct in which the
defendant engaged. See James A. Kobak, Jr., A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse for Intellectual
Property Cases, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (1992) (arguing that Lasercomb's license had
a "legitimate purpose ... to prevent ... surreptitious creation of disguised copies," though
"undoubtedly a narrower, less overreaching provision could have served this purpose").
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the IP owner at the expense of the user. But even this selfish
purpose may be socially useful. Conceivably, further
strengthening IP owners' rights, at the cost of users, may
stimulate other potential inventors and creators, who otherwise
would not be inclined to do so, to produce and publish;
concomitantly, it may decrease their incentive to rely upon self-
help measures, such as trade secrecy. Of course, to say that
permitting the concession may have this beneficial effect is not
the same as concluding that it will, or that the marginal benefits
outweigh the corresponding social costs.
In any event, requiring the court to focus upon the
underlying reason for (possibly) permitting the IP owner to
extract a challenged concession might have the salutary effect of
enabling courts to apply an analytical framework, inspired by
standard antitrust analysis, as a means of reducing both error
and adjudication costs. To put this framework in context, in
antitrust law a few types of conduct (such as horizontal price
fixing) are deemed so likely to generate net anticompetitive harm
that courts are confident to condemn them on a per se basis,
without inquiring too deeply into the specific facts and
circumstances.'83 This truncated approach conserves adjudicative
costs, is likely to generate few "false positives" (wrongly
condemning welfare-enhancing conduct), and, to the extent it
generates "false negatives" (condemning conduct that is unlikely,
in reality, to give rise to anticompetitive harm), the resulting
costs are likely to be small, given the paucity of social benefits
from even futile efforts to fix prices (for example, among firms
that lack market power).' With respect to other types of conduct,
however, that, depending on the facts, could have (on balance)
either pro- or anticompetitive effects, analysis usually continues
by focusing upon whether the restraint at issue plausibly can be
viewed as either integral or ancillary to the joint provision of
183. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2002)
("[Clategorical rules-such as the rule of per se antitrust illegality-reflect broad
generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry into whether they apply to the
case at hand would be needless and wasteful." (citing Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.16 (1977); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504
U.S. 451, 486-87 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) (noting that, "[flor the sake of business certainty and
litigation efficiency," per se rules condemn "some agreements that a fullblown inquiry
might have proved to be reasonable").
184. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (remarking that "any attempt by [a company with little market
power] to engage in a monopolistic restriction of output would be little short of suicidal");
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 269 (1978)
("Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter
into conspiracies to fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.").
2007] 945
946 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:4
some good or service that consumers demand. 8 ' If the answer to
this question is affirmative, then the antitrust plaintiff typically
must demonstrate actual or potential anticompetitive harm by
presenting evidence of market power or other relevant factors.'86
In this way, antitrust analysis can be viewed as an effort to
minimize the total cost of false positives, false negatives, and
adjudication. 87
My suggestion here is that a similar type of framework
might usefully be incorporated into misuse analysis. Consider
first a case in which the proposed justification for the concession
at issue is that it encourages licensees to promote products
embodying the IPR or minimizes the transaction costs of
licensing. Two points are worth noting initially. First, if we abide
by the principle that courts should defer to Congress's judgment
that IPRs in general generate more benefits than costs, then
restraints enabling the efficient use or management of IPRs
probably also should be, as a general matter, deemed
legitimate.' If the law encourages the creation or publication of
185. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2006) (declining to apply per se
condemnation to restraints that involve core activities, or are ancillary to a legitimate
purpose, of a joint venture).
186. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(stating that "combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical
arrangements... , are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and
market structure"); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065
(11th Cir. 2005) (stating that, under the rule of reason, "[tihe plaintiff bears an initial
burden of demonstrating that the alleged agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive
effects within the relevant product and geographic markets, i.e., market power" (citing
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986))); see also Ind.
Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61 ("'[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as a
reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a
,surrogate for detrimental effects.'" (internal citation omitted)).
187. C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 44 (1999); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page,
Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 387
(2001).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79. The text above does not necessarily
imply, however, that IP owners should be accorded broader control over derivative uses of
their works, or that terms of protection should be further extended, so as to enable them
to better coordinate follow-up uses of those works, to maintain artificial scarcity, or the
like. In fact, I am quite skeptical of such arguments for broader and longer IPRs. See
Cotter, supra note 173, at 384-87 (arguing that broader rights amount to "private acts of
censorship, under the guise of copyright law, [which] is difficult to reconcile with any of
the plausible instrumental goals of copyright," such as "quantity, diffusion, and possibly
diversity"); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 129 (2004) (claiming broader rights to IP owners "to
mandate or control works that have already been created" are "strikingly anti-market"
and "reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the economics of private ordering"). I also
doubt, however, that unilaterally withholding one's lawfully procured IP from the market,
in order to render it more scarce or to prevent certain follow-up uses, should be viewed as
misuse, absent adoption of a copyright or patent working requirement of the type that
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X, in other words, then contracts designed to encourage people to
use or read or listen to X, or to reduce the cost of their so doing,
should be subject to at least a rebuttable presumption of
validity.'89 Second, however, it is conceivable that in some cases
free speech (or perhaps, though I personally remain somewhat
skeptical, other possible interests, including the distributive
justice interests suggested above)90 might dictate that the court
give short shrift to any such ancillary justification. A
hypothetical license provision forbidding the user from ever
criticizing the licensed work in any forum, for example, might
present such a case. Although the provision would perhaps serve
the overall purpose of encouraging the licensee to promote and
advertise the work at issue, 9' enforcing such a restraint
threatens to deprive both the user and the public of the many
benefits of open and robust debate. Subject to these
qualifications, however, if the purpose of the restraint is a
legitimate one and no free speech or other interests point the
other way, analysis of whether the concession should be
permitted should proceed along familiar antitrust lines. Thus,
the next stage of the analysis typically would entail consideration
of such matters as whether the IP owner has market power in
some properly defined market, or whether the concession at issue
otherwise results in demonstrable anticompetitive
consequences. 9 If the answer to these questions is no, analysis
can end there; otherwise, the court would need to consider
traditionally has been absent from the U.S. system. But cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY 248-54 (2004) (proposing that, at some point, copyright owners
should be required to register their works or else forfeit their copyright protection); Kurt
M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology
Suppression, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 389, 430-31 (2002) (discussing whether patent
suppression should be viewed as a type of misuse, contra 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), or under
some circumstances an antitrust violation). Of course, unilateral refusals to deal might in
some rare circumstances constitute antitrust violations. See supra note 51.
189. Of course, other laws (e.g., false advertising, obscenity) may be designed to
discourage people from using, reading, or listening. As noted above, however, U.S. law
generally takes the position that IPRs may subsist in such works nonetheless. See supra
note 162. Logically, this would seem to suggest that contracts encouraging the use of such
works should not be viewed as a form of transactional misuse, even if they are
unenforceable for some other reason.
190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
191. Of course, even if one were to put aside free speech objections, some
hypothetical anticriticism agreements might not be reasonably necessary to achieve this
purpose. Imagine, for example, an agreement not to criticize the licensed work or, say, the
entire entertainment industry, in any forum.
192. But cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 180, § 5.6c, at 256-57 (providing a roadmap to
characterize agreements and treating "the distinction between the per se rule and the rule
of reason as soft rather than hard").
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whether the concession has any actual, as opposed to
hypothetical, competitive benefits, and whether it is no broader
than is reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose.
Only in the rare case in which the answer to both of these latter
questions is yes would a court have to engage in the difficult
balancing of pro- and anticompetitive consequences.!
Next, consider a case in which the concession enables the
IP owner to engage in price discrimination. This issue is likely
to arise in cases involving restraints on the exercise of first-
sale rights, such as in Mallinckrodt and the two Monsanto
cases, because the principal effect of such restraints is to
enable IP owners to engage in second-degree price
discrimination.' As I have discussed elsewhere, drawing on
the work of other scholars, the social welfare consequences of
such price discrimination schemes are ambiguous."' On the
one hand, output may be higher than it would be under a
regime that forbids price discrimination, as IP owners seek to
serve a portion of consumers who would not be willing to pay
the unitary, profit-maximizing monopoly price; but it is also
possible, under some circumstances, that output will be
lower.'96 In addition, to the extent the ability to price
discriminate offers the prospect of higher monopoly rents, it
may induce more inventive and creative effort than would
otherwise be the case; this added stimulus may be
unnecessary, however, or even counterproductive, to the extent
it induces investment that might be more socially productive
elsewhere.'97 Whether the purpose of enabling second-degree
price discrimination should be viewed as a legitimate one,
possibly justifying an agreement to waive first-sale rights,
therefore depends to a large extent on one's ultimate views of
the net merits of price discrimination, a point to which I
return below.'98
193. Id. § 5.6c, at 257. See generally United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229,
237-38 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Certain arrangements, such as price fixing and market division,
are considered unreasonable per se, but most other restraints are evaluated case-by-case,
under the 'rule of reason'"); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499,
508-17 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that the "three methods are best viewed as a continuum,
on which the 'amount and range of information needed' to evaluate a restraint varies
depending on how 'highly suspicious' and how 'unique' the restraint is" (internal citation
omitted)).
194. Cotter, supra note 161, at 547.
195. Id. at 547 (citing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 169, at 40, 378, 389; Michael J.
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 73-75 (2001)).
196. Id. at 548.
197. Id.
198. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
[44:4
MISUSE
Third, consider a restraint that strengthens the IP owner's
hand but does not appear to serve any other ancillary purpose.
Even here, permitting the IP owner to extract the concession may
enhance social welfare to the extent it increases social incentives
to invent, create, and publish; the more valuable the IPR, the
stronger the incentive, all other things being equal. Depending
on the circumstances, however, those benefits may be large or
small; the smaller the benefits appear to be, the more important
the potential costs, even costs that otherwise might not be of
interest in an antitrust forum. In particular, as the social
benefits of permitting the concession approach zero, even
relatively remote costs (e.g., relatively small threats to static
efficiency or relatively speculative threats to dynamic efficiency)
or costs that would not be cognizable in an antitrust forum, such
as costs to free speech, may loom large. Courts might rightfully
be more skeptical of efforts to interpret IPRs broadly, when the
only credible justification for the concession at issue is to
strengthen IP incentives. In the following section, I provide some
suggested analyses of cases falling within this and the other two
categories.
B. Applying an Antitrust-Inspired Framework
The framework depicted above is probably easiest to apply in
the first class of cases involving, as plausible justifications for a
challenged concession, interests such as promotion or advertising
or transaction-cost reduction. In such cases, absent some
compelling free speech or other countervailing noneconomic
interest, I have argued that misuse analysis should proceed along
familiar antitrust lines. Applying this analysis to cases such as
Brulotte, PSC, and Lasercomb, among others, probably would
have reversed the outcome of those cases.9 In all of those cases,
there Was a plausible justification for the restraint at issue; in
none of them does there appear to have been much evidence that
the challenged provision was likely to have any significant
impact upon competition or innovation, or free speech rights."0
199. Overruling Brulotte, of course, would require Supreme Court action.
200. But see Cross & Yu, supra note 163, at 19 ("The copyright owner's acts in
Lasercomb constituted misuse because they were an attempt to evade one of the limits
that Congress placed on a copyright owner's rights: the idea-expression dichotomy.");
Note, supra note 164, at 1308 (arguing that Lasercomb vindicated a free speech interest
in access to ideas); Judge, supra note 177, at 930-31 (arguing that "the idea/expression
distinction.., was central to both Lasercomb and Alcatel," "that copyright misuse should
protect the values embodied in the First Amendment," and that "any attempt by a
copyright holder to cross the idea/expression boundary or to deter fair use of his
copyrighted material [should be] deemed misuse"). To the extent the restraints at issue in
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Which is not to say that the type of conduct at issue in these
cases never could have such an impact; had the defendants come
forward with evidence that the restraints at issue really did
threaten anticompetitive harm, due to the lack of available
substitutes or other market imperfections, then perhaps a
finding of misuse (or outright antitrust liability) would have been
appropriate.0 In Lasercomb, in particular, the license provisions
at issue may have been broader than necessary to achieve any
ancillary purpose."2 Even so, an antitrust court typically would
not condemn such a restraint-indeed, it would not even arrive
at this point of the analysis-absent proof of anticompetitive
effects. By contrast, the Federal Circuit's recent decision in
Philips exonerating the use of package licensing appears
correct."' The procompetitive benefits of the arrangement, as
described by the Federal Circuit, are at least plausible, unless
outweighed by evidence that the agreements would enable
Philips to discourage competition in the market for the essential
204Abetscpatents . Absent such evidence of anticompetitive effects-or
other negative consequences, such as free speech restraints,
which typically would not be implicated in the patent misuse
context2°5-there is no good reason to condemn the restraint.
An interesting hypothetical case to consider in light of the
preceding framework involves the recently publicized exclusive
distributorship involving The Weinstein Company and
Lasercomb and Alcatel prevented the reverse engineering of software for the purpose of
extracting uncopyrightable ideas, a finding that the restraints were unenforceable for
that reason alone might be consistent with my analysis. Such a limited holding, however,
should not in my view result in the unenforceability of the copyright tout court. See infra
text accompanying notes 232-37.
201. See Michael J. Meurer & Maureen A. O'Rourke, IP License Terms, Misuse,
Preemption, and Competition Law Principles (unpublished abstract, on file with The
Houston Law Review) (arguing that "occasionally IP licenses have an exclusionary effect
on horizontal competitors of the IP owner which justifies a finding of preemption or
misuse").
202. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
Lasercomb has the right to protect against the copying of its work but finding that the
licensing agreement was "extremely broad").
203. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1190-93 (2005)
(stating that a "package licensing agreement that includes both essential and
nonessential patents does not. . . foreclos[e] the competitor from licensing his alternative
technology").
204. Id.
205. But see Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 150-60 (2000)
(arguing that patent law must accommodate free speech values, at least to the extent that
software patents read on digitized expression); Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective
on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 880-81 (2007) (arguing that past
approaches to patentable subject matter should be altered to include computer and
business-related art and proposing a reformed and refined approach to patentable subject
matter).
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Blockbuster Video. Under the terms of the deal, Weinstein
agreed to distribute its movies for rental at Blockbuster outlets
only; in return, Blockbuster, inter alia, promised to promote
those films more aggressively to its customers. 06 Weinstein also
would sell copies of the films to retailers such as Costco, however,
and its distributor, Genius Products, has stated it will not
attempt to circumvent the first-sale doctrine by preventing
lawful purchasers of those films from subsequently renting them;
thus, both Blockbuster and Weinstein expect that some of
Blockbuster's competitors will still be able to rent the films to
consumers. 207 Each authorized copy of a Weinstein film that is
made available for retail sale, however, will bear a notice stating
Weinstein has authorized the sale of that DVD for sale only.08
Notwithstanding some negative reactions from consumer
groups,2 9 this arrangement, like the package licensing at issue in
Philips, probably should not be condemned either as an antitrust
violation or as copyright misuse. On the antitrust side, exclusive
distributorship agreements are normally analyzed under the rule
of reason.210 Applying that standard here, the restraint at issue
probably would be viewed, as restraints incident to exclusive
distributorships often are, as reasonably necessary to the
efficient promotion of the Weinstein films for rental-keeping
sufficient quantities of the films in stock, stimulating consumer
206. Susanne Ault, Blockbuster, Weinsteins Sign Exclusive Deal, VIDEO BUS., Nov.
15, 2006, http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6391512.html.
207. Susanne Ault, Genius Chief Exposure Key to Blockbuster Deal, VIDEO Bus.,
Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6394171.html.
208. Id.
209. See Susanne Ault, Buying Group Challenges Weinstein-B'Buster Deal, VIDEO
BuS., Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6398859.html (discussing a
suit filed in Massachusetts state court, alleging miscellaneous unfair competition claims
based upon the "for sale only" labeling).
210. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961) ("In
practical application, even though a contract is found to be an exclusive-dealing
arrangement, it does not violate [Section 31 unless the court believes it probable that
performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected."); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236-38 (lst
Cir. 1983) (noting that courts judging "the lawfulness of contracts to purchase do not
apply a per se rule but a 'rule of reason'"). As a general matter, for an exclusive dealership
to be unlawful, there must be substantial foreclosure in either the upstream or
downstream market; moreover, the shorter the term of the contract, the less likely it will
be held to violate the Sherman Act. See Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 237-38 (holding that
the agreements at issue were not "'exclusionary,'" in part, because of the flexible nature of
the contracts and their fairly short durations). Exclusive distributorships are, if anything,
judged even more leniently. See E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d
23, 29-31 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that exclusive distributorship arrangements are
presumptively legal); Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 46-47 (7th




demand for them, and so on.21 To be sure, many (though not all)
of the Weinstein films already would have played at theaters by
the time they arrive at Blockbuster, thus dissipating somewhat
the need for educating consumers about those films; plus, some
consumers might prefer being able to rent the films from other
sources or to obtain unbiased recommendations from video store
employees. On the other hand, the deal may provide consumers
with desired assurances that they will find Weinstein films in
stock when they go to Blockbuster, and it may facilitate the
provision of information to consumers about some Weinstein
films (particularly straight-to-DVD films) they otherwise would
overlook. In any event, it seems doubtful that antitrust enforcers
would or should intervene to condemn this agreement. Even
assuming Blockbuster possesses substantial market power in the
market for video rentals, notwithstanding competition from other
rental outlets (and from DVD sales and other possible substitutes
for rental), antitrust enforcers rightly would take Weinstein's
copyrights as a given; assuming the legitimacy of those copyright
rights, efforts to stimulate consumer demand for products
embodying those rights, through promotion and advertising, are
(as I have argued above) almost certainly legitimate purposes as
well. As long as the terms of the deal can be viewed as reasonably
necessary to serve these purposes, it seems unlikely that any
potential anticompetitive effects in the market for video rentals
would be significant enough to result in invalidation of the deal.
(The press reports do not disclose the duration of the contract,
however, which is often an important consideration in exclusive
dealing cases.)
Similarly, on the misuse side, I see no reason to depart from
antitrust principles, notwithstanding the possibility that there
may be some anticompetitive impact, even if it is too slight or too
speculative to warrant much concern under antitrust
standards-and despite my own lingering skepticism that
consumers really stand to benefit much from the aggressive
211. See Ault, supra note 207 (quoting Genius Products' CEO Trevor Drinkwater as
stating that Blockbuster would promote the films through "a fully integrated marketing
plan from pre-theatrical all the way to video," and that "[flor direct-to-video, there will be
a high level of exposure, as Blockbuster will be recommending them as good films to
rent"); see also Paddock, 103 F.3d at 45 (stating that "[clompetition-for-the-contract is a
form of competition that antitrust laws protect rather than proscribe," and "a market in
which the creators of intellectual property ... could not decide how best to market it for
maximum profit would be a market with less (or less interesting) intellectual property
created in the first place"); Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for
Distribution, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 169, 172-75 (2006) (arguing that promotional contracts
can solve an incentive compatibility problem under which manufacturers prefer that
retailers engage in more promotion than retailers would undertake on their own).
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promotion of Weinstein films. The problem is that if a court were
to invalidate the agreement on the grounds that the invalidation
of this one deal would not diminish incentives to produce and
distribute films (which may well be true), and might even
generate some social benefits, there would be no natural stopping
point. As noted above, exclusive distributorships are pervasive
and, in general, antitrust law does not condemn them because of
their potential procompetitive benefits.212 If every exclusive
distributorship agreement involving IPRs were to become
potential fodder for the application of the misuse doctrine
instead, the cost of entering into exclusive distributorships would
rise significantly; both adjudication costs and false positives
would become more problematic. Moreover, I doubt that there are
any substantial free speech or other policies beyond the domain
of competition law that should be accorded much weight in the
present context. True, to the extent that Blockbuster favors
Weinstein films over others, or even succeeds in putting some
smaller video rental stores out of business, the availability of
other films for rental may decrease; expressive diversity could
suffer. But for now there appear to be many other outlets for
video rentals, including online services such as Netflix (which
itself has exclusive arrangements with some independent film
distributors)213 that can cater to more specialized tastes. Contrast
this state of affairs with the extraction of promises not to reverse
engineer or to criticize another's copyrighted work, discussed
below.214 In these latter cases, it is not illogical to respect
Congress's judgment to grant copyright rights generally (despite
the possible anticompetitive consequences, e.g. deadweight loss,
resulting therefrom) but not to construe those rights as enabling
the owner to extract promises not to reverse engineer or to
criticize; such promises arguably pose a great risk of causing
harm to dynamic efficiency and to speech beyond what is
necessary to induce the creation and publication of copyrightable
material. It is much less apparent, however, that exclusive
distributorships pose any analogous threats that are not
adequately captured by the standard antitrust framework.
A more difficult set of cases involves restraints on the
exercise of first-sale rights, such as Mallinckrodt, the two
Monsanto cases, or a hypothetical variation of the Weinstein deal
in which Weinstein does sell the DVDs only on condition that
they not be rented for commercial purposes, i.e., it attempts to
212. See supra text accompanying note 204.
213. Ault, supra note 206.
214. See infra notes 218-31 and accompanying text.
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override first-sale. Given the ambiguity of the economic
consequences, it would not be irrational to conclude that the
effort to override first-sale rights is on balance welfare-reducing,
even though there is no demonstrable anticompetitive harm in
any given case. The correct outcome therefore may depend on
where one believes the risk of error should lie. In my own
previous work, I have suggested that the potential costs of
permitting waivers of first-sale rights do not so clearly dominate
the potential benefits as to forbid such waivers outright.21 5 To the
extent my conclusion is correct, it would support the outcomes in
Mallinckrodt and the two Monsanto cases, and would support
Weinstein's attempt to override the first-sale doctrine in my
hypothetical cases. Someone starting from the opposite
presumption, however, could just as easily argue that the
potential benefits of first-sale waivers do not so clearly dominate
the potential costs as to compel the routine of enforcement of
waivers, particularly in mass market licenses. What may be
dispositive, however, is the fact that, absent the price
discrimination that can result from waivers of first-sale rights, IP
owners may simply find other ways to charge more to "heavy"
users of their works-for example, through tying arrangements
(as long as the IP owner lacks market power in the market for
the tying product, and thus cannot be guilty of a per se tying
offense or of misuse) that meter uses of the tying product through
sales of the tied product.216 If outright price discrimination is no
215. See Cotter, supra note 161, at 547-49.
216. See id. at 545-46 (noting that tying arrangements can serve a metering purpose);
Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak- Applying Post-
Contract Hold-up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283, 313-14 (1999)
(noting that tying contracts often are used for metering purposes and arguing, in addition, that
it is "invalid to infer market power from the existence of a metering arrangement").
Alternatively, product design-programming or formulating a product so that it cannot be
reused, for example-may sometimes serve as a substitute for contractual restraints. This
insight has led some commentators to question whether product design and contractual
restraints should be treated differently. Compare Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects,
Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 399 & n.56 (2005) (suggesting that
restraints inherent to product design might be more problematic, from the standpoint of
personal autonomy, than contractual restraints), with Robinson, supra note 8, at 1516-23
(suggesting that both types of restraints should be lawful). For better or worse, out of concern
that courts become entangled in questions concerning design choices, theories of predatory
innovation-that innovation may violate antitrust law by raising rivals' costs without
providing a commensurate social benefit-have not won widespread favor, despite their
potential theoretic appeal. See generally Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic
Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981) (presenting a
theory of predatory innovation). See also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming judgment that a product design change violated antitrust law);
Hanna, supra note 175, at 436-37 (describing market configurations where "predatory product
innovation" may be successful in driving away competition); Maria Lillk Montagnani,
Predatory and Exclusionary Innovation: Which Legal Standard for Software Integration in the
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worse than the alternatives to which IP owners otherwise would
resort, it's a bit hard to see why first-sale waivers intended to
enable price discrimination should be condemned. 217
The third category--cases in which the restraint at issue
appears to be justified only by the IP owner's desire to increase
licensing revenues-is the one in which courts most frequently
might depart, with good reason, from normal antitrust
standards. To illustrate, suppose a copyright owner conditions
access to her copyrighted software, as embodied in a video game,
upon the purchaser agreeing not to reverse-engineer the software
so as to extract uncopyrightable applications program interfaces
(APIs) that would enable the purchaser to create other games
that would be compatible with the owner's video game system.21 s
Here, the principal reason to enforce the condition may be simply
that it permits the owner to extract additional rent from
purchasers who are willing to pay for access to the APIs for the
purpose of creating compatible games.219 Consistent with the
copyright incentive scheme, the prospect of attaining such rents
might stimulate others to invest in creating and publishing their
own copyrightable works; by most (though not necessarily all)
accounts, this additional stimulus counts as a social benefit.
Moreover, not enforcing the condition might encourage copyright
owners to find other, more costly ways to discourage reverse
engineering (for example, investing time and effort to make
reverse engineering particularly difficult), which in turn might
Context of the Competition v. Intellectual Property Rights Clash? (2006) (unpublished
abstract), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=804985
(addressing the "line between predatory and competitive innovation" and the "balance
between the market leaders' freedom to innovate and the public interest towards the
persistence of competitive markets").
217. Though perhaps there are reasons, other than some (arguably misguided) effort
at combating price discrimination, in support of a first-sale doctrine that is more than
simply a default rule, Professor Robinson, rightly in my view, targets some of the
traditional arguments in favor of the first-sale doctrine. See Robinson, supra note 8, at
1480-92, 1496-97 (calling into doubt the "restraints on alienation" and "single reward"
theories). Perhaps, though, some sort of distributive justice argument---e.g., that first-sale
enables users who are unable to pay even marginal cost to obtain copies of books and
other works at prices below marginal cost-could be made in favor of the doctrine. See
Cotter, supra note 161, at 547-48 (noting those wishing to protect externalities such as
"spillover educational benefits" would prefer the first-sale doctrine so that those who
cannot afford the marginal cost of the product could still reap the benefits of its use).
218. See Cotter, supra note 161, at 510-16 (discussing the facts at issue in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1993), and Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000)).
219. Although there might be a price discrimination rationale lurking here as well,
see id. at 549 n.271 (arguing that "restrictions on reverse engineering can ... be viewed as
means for enabling price discrimination"), or a quality control issue, see Sony, 203 F.3d at
608-09 (arguing a copyright "suffers negative associations" when consumers confuse it
with another product).
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constitute a social waste. On the other hand, enforcing the
condition restricts competition in the market for compatible
games. How substantial this loss will be will depend upon the
specific facts; ownership of the copyright in the reverse-
engineered software may or may not confer meaningful power
over some well-defined market. But reverse engineering also has
the potential to generate positive externalities by leading to new
discoveries and new innovation down the road. Again, depending
on the facts, these potential static and dynamic efficiency effects
may not be sufficiently concrete to matter much in an antitrust
context, where the risk of false positives (wrongly condemning
conduct that is not, in reality, inefficient) is typically substantial.
If, however, one reasonably believes that in the present context
the social benefits of enforcing the condition are also minimal,
because the incremental increase in copyright owner incentives is
de minimis, then the better choice may be to condemn the
condition, even though the social cost from enforcing it is
somewhat speculative. Such, at any rate, is the logic behind case
law holding the right to reverse engineer software for the
purpose of creating complementary products to be a fair use.22° If
this reasoning is correct, then arguably a contractual restriction
on the purchaser's ability to reverse engineer should be equally
suspect, particularly if the envisioned social costs would be borne
primarily by persons not parties to the contract.
220. Cotter, supra note 161, at 541-44.
221. For a case to the contrary, however, see Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,
320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Bowers involved a shrinkwrap license that purported to
obligate the purchaser of a software package not to reverse-engineer the software. Id. at
1322. After Baystate ignored the restriction and marketed a competing product, a jury
found it liable for breach of contract and for copyright and patent infringement. Id. The
Federal Circuit reversed the judgment as to patent infringement, holding that the fair use
doctrine permitted the reverse-engineering. Id. at 1325, 1334. Nevertheless, it concluded
that Baystate breached the license and that copyright law did not preempt the license; the
opinion makes no mention of misuse. Id. at 1326-27. As a matter of policy, interpreting
the fair use doctrine to permit reverse-engineering to produce a competing product is not
as easy to defend as a rule permitting reverse-engineering to produce a compatible
product. Cotter, supra note 161, at 542-43. Once the decision is made that fair use does
protect a form of reverse engineering, however, enforcing a contract forbidding that fair
use should be problematic. The justification for finding fair use is not merely, as the court
suggests, to enable access to uncopyrightable ideas, see id. at 514-in which case,
upholding a freely negotiated agreement not to access them might be defensible if it
affected no one but the parties-but more fundamentally to vindicate a perceived social
interest in permitting a form of competition. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
As David Nimmer points out, however, the holding in Bowers is somewhat at odds with
the Federal Circuit's subsequent discussion in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc. to the effect that the DMCA should not be read as permitting "any
copyright owner, through a combination of contractual terms and technological measures,
to repeal the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work."
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
More generally, restraining users from exercising rights that
have come to be viewed as permissible under copyright's fair use
doctrine are troubling because fair use-more so than many
other IP doctrines-seems designed, at least in part, to encourage
unauthorized uses which are likely to give rise to net positive
social externalities (such as those associated with reverse
engineering), notwithstanding the copyright owner's objections.222
In this light, agreements forbidding reverse engineering for the
purpose of creating compatible products in particular should be
troubling because (1) the anticompetitive harm, though
speculative, may be quite substantial, and (2) the procompetitive
benefit of enforcing the restraint is probably slight. But
restraints on the exercise of fair use rights may be problematic
for other reasons too. Suppose instead that a copyright owner
conditions access to its work upon the user's agreement not to
quote from or criticize the work. Quotation for the purpose of
commentary or critique is, of course, a long-standing example of
fair use, and for good reason. Even if a user were willing to abide
by the stated condition, third parties would be deprived of the
social benefits of commentary or critique. These third parties
would include not only members of the general public, who,
consistent with standard First Amendment theory, stand to
benefit from free and open discussion of ideas, but also other
content owners who, on average, benefit from the value of
unauthorized critique as a form of credible advertising. '23 A
copyright owner's insistence upon such a condition therefore
might seem to be a good candidate for at least a rebuttable
presumption of misuse, even if the anticompetitive effect of the
restraint in a given case seems minimal (for example, due to the
presence of numerous good substitutes for the copyrighted work
at issue). To the extent that freedom of speech principles favor
the creation of a diversity of a works and the autonomy of
commentators and critics as goods in and of themselves, the
quoted in 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 162, § 13.09[A][3][b], at 13-306; see also
Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote: Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903,
912 (2005) (siding "with those who say contractual waivers of fair use should be
preempted, at least in the typical shrinkwrap context"). But see Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1612-13 (1995) (book review) (arguing that parties should be
permitted to contract out of a fair use right to reverse engineer unless the market
structure is so anticompetitive that the restriction becomes a form of private legislation).
222. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (presenting a model of the private costs and benefits
faced by would-be users of copyrighted materials in settings in which economic analysis
suggests the fair use doctrine should apply).
223. See id. at 13.
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resulting loss of diversity and commentary that would follow
from enforcing the restraint should count as a real, albeit
unquantifiable, harm.224
The more difficult issue, in my view, is whether contractual
restraints on reverse engineering or other possible fair uses
should be viewed as misuse per se, or should instead be subject to
some further inquiry into their actual effects. On the one hand, if
one permits courts to examine the individual merits, misuse
analysis might become less predictable, and courts might be
called upon to engage in case-by-case balancing of unquantifiable
costs and benefits.22 Conceivably, if this danger looms large
enough, or (to put the matter another way) if the costs of
adjudication in this context typically overwhelm the stakes
involved, perhaps a per se rule condemning such contracts
outright would be preferable, even at the risk of some false
positive costs. On the other hand, perhaps there are
circumstances in which reverse engineering should not qualify as
a fair use of a copyrighted work, and therefore a restraint on
reverse engineering should be enforced, not condemned. In
Davidson & Associates v. Jung,22 for example, the defendants
reverse engineered the plaintiffs computer game software to
develop an online gaming server that would enable gamers to
play the plaintiffs computer games without having to use the
224. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and 'Market Power' in the Marketplace of
Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES, supra note
163, at 168 (arguing that "the value of expressive diversity, in the sense of diverse
political and artistic viewpoint as opposed to product differentiation per se, lies largely in
our fundamental, extra-economic commitments to individual self-expression and a robust
system of free speech"). But cf. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works!Unique Challenges at
the Intellectual Property/Competition Law Interface, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 133 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu, eds., 2005) (arguing
that competition law should take a more aggressive approach to ensuring access to
"unique" works, especially where "the payoffs associated with the rights
are.. extraordinarily high relative to the inventive contributions made" and "there is
little danger that reducing the licensor's flexibility would strip it of the ability to earn an
adequate return on investment").
Unfortunately, courts do not always agree with this sort of reasoning. For
example, in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1569 (E.D. Va. 1996),
the court concluded copyright's merger doctrine did not entitle the defendant to copy
certain documents considered scriptural by the Scientology religion on the ground that
"theological musings on the sources of (and remedies for) spiritual harm have dominated
discussion about religion for centuries." Id. at 1573. From an economic standpoint, the
conclusion that adequate substitutes existed for the documents at issue was almost
certainly correct. From a free speech and freedom of religion perspective, however, it is
doubtful whether the existence of economic substitutes should be dispositive.
225. See supra text accompanying note 183.
226. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
plaintiffs own server.127 Unfortunately, the defendant's server
also enabled players to trade unauthorized copies of the
plaintiffs games."' For this reason, the court may have been
right, both as a matter of law and policy, to conclude that the
defendant's conduct violated the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions.229 Alternatively, there may be cases in which a
prohibition of conduct that initially sounds as if it should be
protected by fair use, such as criticism, may be valid. Recall from
above that in Video Pipeline the court suggested Disney's
imposition of such a term in its contracts with website operators
displaying Disney movie trailers might have been justified
because, inter alia, the operators remained free to criticize
Disney elsewhere, criticism was in fact readily available
elsewhere, and invalidation of the restraint might have induced
Disney not to make the trailers available at all.23° At this point, I
would suggest only that a contract prohibiting reverse
engineering or criticism falls into the class of contracts that
might be inconsistent with federal copyright law, to the extent
they undermine substantial purposes of that law, and therefore
might qualify as copyright misuse. But perhaps even some of
these contracts may survive if the copyright owner can plead and
prove an adequate, copyright-consistent justification for the
restraint.23'
C. Standing, Remedies, and Litigation Misuse
The analysis thus far has left open, among other things, the
related issues of standing and remedies. With respect to these
issues, a concern that I and others have expressed before is that
the potential uncertainty and error costs of misuse doctrine are
likely exacerbated when the remedy for the misuse is
unenforceability of the IPR; the cost of a false positive then
becomes very high.232 Consider again the reverse-engineering
example. Suppose that, if one were able to quantify the net
227. Id. at 636.
228. Id. at 640.
229. Id. at 641. Less persuasive, however, is the court's dictum that contractual
restraints on the reverse engineering of code are in general enforceable. Id. at 639.
230. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d
Cir. 2003).
231. Contractual restraints on reverse engineering trade secrets would seem to be
even more clearly preempted, insofar as the ability to reverse engineer is one point of
distinction between patent and trade secret law. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 476, 489-90 (1974) (contrasting the protection of patents as opposed to the
weaker coverage for a trade secret).
232. See Cotter, supra note 161, at 537.
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expected social harm from enforcing the reverse-engineering
limitation, it would be $100,000. The existence of such expected
harm provides a good reason not to enforce the condition. If the
penalty is enhanced to include nonenforceability of the IPR,
however, the cost/benefit calculus has the potential to radically
change. Although it may be impossible to even roughly quantify
the consequences of nonenforceability, one can easily imagine a
few possible effects. First, if courts are willing to find misuse in a
broad range of cases, one likely effect is that IPRs will become
less valuable and IP owners less willing to "push the envelope" by
extracting borderline concessions. This may not matter much if
IPRs generally do not offer more than a modest stimulus to
creativity and publication; but how can we can be sure of this ex
ante? Moreover, to the extent that IP owners are chilled from
extracting concessions that might lead to their loss of IPRs, IP
users may suffer too. Cases such as Brulotte are hardly an
unmitigated boon for IP users, who as noted above, may see their
financing options limited."' Second, it's not clear that the
unenforceability penalty is necessary to attain the social wealth-
maximizing result. Under normal conditions, one would expect
that holding the offending condition unenforceable (without
rendering the IPR unenforceable) would suffice to dissipate its
harm.234 Alternatively, if courts perceive the penalty for misuse as
being too onerous, the penalty paradoxically may deter too little,
due to reluctance to invoke it.2"5
All of this suggests to me that, in the typical case in which
the basis of the alleged misuse is the IP owner's attempt to
extract concessions from purchasers or licensees, a judgment that
the offending condition is unenforceable should suffice to remedy
the misuse; anything more seems unnecessary and could lead to
an imbalance of costs and benefits. (Of course, to the extent the
misuse is independently tortious-for example, it constitutes an
233. See supra note 169.
234. In theory, one might imagine cases in which an offending provision continues to
be used simply because no licensee has the temerity to challenge it; though penalty
clauses themselves are generally unenforceable and, if the market of licensees is thick
enough, one would not expect this condition to persist indefinitely. See also Dolan, supra
note 116, at 1, 42-44 (arguing the unenforceability penalty, coupled with the lack-of-
standing feature, of current copyright misuse doctrine may encourage licensees to take
advantage of unsophisticated licensors by advocating the inclusion of license provisions
that will result in a finding of misuse); Judge, supra note 177, at 940 (same).
235. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 961 & n.45 (2004) (noting that, in
both patent and criminal-law contexts, factfinders sometimes resort to nullification when
the penalty appears disproportionate).
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antitrust violation-the tort remedy would still be available to
the tort plaintiff or counterclaimant.) Adopting such a rule for
transactional misuse would effectively merge this type of misuse
into standard preemption doctrine; federal patent or copyright
law would preempt certain licensing conditions that are deemed
grossly inconsistent with the purposes of those laws, without
however providing a basis for rendering the IPR unenforceable
altogether.23
At the same time, the rule would tend to eliminate another
curious feature of misuse doctrine, namely the "standing
anomaly." If offending licensing provisions were nullified but had
no other impact on the IP owner's rights, infringement
defendants who are not parties to such provisions would have
236. Section 301 of the Copyright Act explicitly preempts
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Many courts have expressed the view that Section 301 does not
preempt claims for breach of contract because contract claims, by definition, are not
"'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright'" as
specified by Section 106. E.g., ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir.
1996). Whether this is the correct interpretation of Section 301 remains unclear; even if it
is, it nevertheless may be the case that some claims, including breach of contract claims,
are implicitly preempted by federal copyright law to the extent their enforcement would
conflict with or substantially undermine federal copyright policy. See Lemley, Beyond
Preemption, supra note 113, at 141-51; Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of
Judicial Interpretation of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, at 54-69,
111-24 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 07-27, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=978500. If so, there would
appear to be no material difference between a finding of transactional misuse leading only
to the unenforceability of a challenged provision, on the one hand, and a finding that that
provision is preempted, on the other. But see Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 113,
at 157-58 ("[Blecause copyright misuse is a fact-specific doctrine tailored to the
circumstances of individual cases, it may prove a better tool both for tailoring copyright
incentives and for avoiding the reticence that surrounds coarser tools such as
preemption.").
In a recent paper, Professor Tom Bell in effect argues that a finding of copyright
misuse should not be equivalent to a finding that the contractual provision at issue is
preempted by federal copyright law; rather, misuse should leave the common-law contract
rights in place. By this mechanism, copyright owners could opt out of copyright law altogether
and rely exclusively upon contract rights to safeguard their creations. Tom W. Bell, Codifying
Copyright's Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13),
available at httpl/papers.ssrn.con/sol3lpapers.cfm?abstractid=983805. In my view,
however, this interpretation of copyright misuse would permit copyright owners to
override precisely those limitations that copyright law imposes in order to induce
unauthorized uses that are likely to generate positive externalities. I have argued in this
paper that relatively few licensing practices should qualify as misuse; but when a finding
of misuse is appropriate, in order to preserve and vindicate certain values implicit within
the copyright system, permitting the copyright owner to enforce the contract dehors the
copyright framework would tend to undermine those very values.
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much less reason to raise the matter in the first place. But even
if they did, for example, to gain leverage in settlement
negotiations, courts probably should enforce normal standing
doctrine to preclude such inquiry. In such a case, there is no
compelling reason to entrust the infringement defendant with
vindicating the public interest as it relates to the provision at
issue; if a party to the provision at issue believes it is
unenforceable as a matter of patent or copyright preemption,
there is quite literally nothing to stop him from challenging the
offending provision in court, as long as a sufficient case or
controversy exists .237
It may nevertheless be wise to retain the unenforceability
option with respect to "litigation misuse" of the type discussed by
Judge Posner in Assessment Technologies.235 In a companion
paper, I argue the unenforceability penalty that accompanies
misuse under existing law may indeed be necessary to deter
overly aggressive assertions of IPRs which otherwise threaten to
discourage lawful conduct on the part of would-be users.3 9 In
such a case, defining an objectively bad-faith assertion of IPRs as
misuse might provide a more effective deterrent against such
abuse than the more typical range of litigation sanctions-
though precisely how much of a deterrent is optimal remains an
open question. Kathryn Judge argues, for example, that the more
limited sanction of converting the IP owner's entitlement from a
property-rule to a liability-rule entitlement (one enforceable only
by way of a damages judgment, and not by way of injunctive
relief) would provide an adequate sanction and would be less
susceptible to overdeterring zealous but good-faith assertions of
IPRs.24 ° I do not propose to settle this matter here, but only to
note that, in cases involving litigation misuse, something more
than merely rendering the offensive exercise of the IPR a nullity
(e.g., merely entering judgment for the IP defendant in a
frivolous copyright infringement suit) may be necessary to
237. A patent or copyright licensee need not even breach the license prior to filing a
declaratory judgment action, if the prospect of provoking an infringement suit subsequent
to such a breach is sufficiently certain. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (holding licensee may commence declaratory judgment action
challenging patent validity or infringement while license remains in effect). I recognize, of
course, that at least on the patent side my proposal to incorporate a standing requirement
into misuse doctrine would necessitate the overruling of Supreme Court cases such as
Morton Salt.
238. Assessment Techs. of Wisc., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (2003).
239. See Cotter, supra note 222, at 39-40.
240. See Judge, supra note 177, at 950-51 (suggesting that courts can avoid the
overdeterrence problem in copyright misuse cases by permitting the copyright plaintiff to
recover damages but not injunctive relief).
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provide adequate deterrence. As with transactional misuse,
however, courts should require the party asserting misuse to be a
victim of the misuse-in this instance, the party who is forced to
defend against the spurious assertion of IPRs. Anything else
would likely give rise to fishing expeditions with respect to one's
assertion of IPRs vis-A-vis third parties; once again, one need not
deputize the IP defendant as roving avenger of the public
interest. Allocating the right to assert the defense to those
actually harmed by the conduct should suffice.24'
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued above that misuse doctrine should be
refashioned in several respects. First, the principle question
should be whether the conduct at issue broadens the scope of the
patent or copyright grant. Where the answer to this question is
unclear as a matter of statutory text or precedent, as it
sometimes will be, courts must consider the policy implications of
construing the grant broadly or narrowly; too broad a
construction may implicate innovation or competition policy, or
free speech concerns. But courts also should be cognizant of the
risk of false positives. Construing the grant too narrowly may
undermine the copyright and patent incentive schemes, induce
costly countermeasures, or increase the cost of licensing. Only
when such risks appear negligible should a court feel free to
vindicate relatively speculative competitive harms. In addition,
courts should work towards developing a more predictable set of
criteria for determining whether misuse has occurred, focusing
attention on a relative handful of recurring situations such as
contractual restrictions on reverse engineering or fair use.
Finally, I have argued that in cases involving transactional
misuse, the penalty should be limited to nonenforceability of the
challenged provision; this reform would impose a standing
requirement that is, by most accounts, absent from the current
241. A potentially difficult question lurking beneath the surface of the text above is
whether it would be litigation or transactional misuse for an IP owner to file suit against
a defendant for breach of a license provision that itself constitutes transactional misuse.
Perhaps transactional misuse would morph into litigation misuse in cases in which the
contractual provision has come to be clearly established as unenforceable; until such time,
asserting a claim based upon the provision would not be sufficiently egregious to
constitute litigation misuse. Ultimately, the question comes to the degree of culpability
that should be required for a finding of litigation misuse--e.g., objective bad faith, or both
objective and subjective bad faith, or some other standard. There might also be tricky
questions concerning the purgation of the misuse. Do its effects dissipate once the
litigation is over and the copyright owner chooses not to appeal? Or only after the
victorious defendant is restored to its prelitigation status, whatever that might mean in
this context?
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system and would in effect merge misuse with preemption
analysis. For litigation misuse of the type arguably at issue in
Assessment Technologies, however, the unenforceability penalty
may continue to be one, though perhaps not the only, option
available to deter abusive litigation. So reformed, misuse would
continue to play a modest, but useful, role in copyright and
patent litigation.
